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ABSTRACT 
 
Once again, politically-driven events in the United States have brought the relationship 
between immigration and crime to the forefront in public, political, and academic discourses. Yet, 
despite proclamations made by a key U.S. political figure claiming that immigrants, specifically 
Mexican immigrants, are “bringing drugs...[and] bringing crime” (Trump, 2015) to U.S. 
communities, criminological research consistently finds that there is either an inverse relationship 
between immigration and crime- or no relationship at all (see Ousey and Kubrin, 2017 and 
National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, 2015 for review). Moreover, with 
decades of research on the relationship between immigration and crime, this large body of 
literature has remained either cross-sectional in nature and/or relied on pan-ethnic foreign-born 
measures of immigration. 
Following the tradition of early urban sociology, this dissertation contributes to 
immigration and crime scholarship by focusing on the dynamic nature of neighborhoods, 
ethnoracial neighborhood structure, and changes in community populations’ ethnic immigrant 
groups on community violent crime. The current work draws upon fundamental ecological 
theories of crime, note-worthy immigration, communities and crime scholarship to argue for 
including measures of ethnicity in immigration and crime studies. Further, it argues that the 
logical next-step in immigration-crime research is to examine how changing community 
population compositions affect safety within neighborhoods inherently shaped by the U.S. 
ethnoracial regime. Using secondary data from the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census, the 2005-2009 
American Community Survey (ACS) and the National Neighborhood Crime Study I and II 
(NNCS) on 814 Chicago census tracts, the current work adds another layer of richness to the 
body of communities, immigration, and crime scholarship. Thus, it presents how all things equal, 
changes (2009-2000) in Chicago communities’ foreign-born populations by ethnicity and nativity 
affect changes in community violent crime (2012). 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
For decades, criminologists have challenged the widely-held, long-standing political and 
public rhetoric claiming that there is a positive, and clear relationship between immigrants, 
immigrant populations, and crime (Chavez, 2013; Johnston and Morse, 2011; Green, 2016; 
Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012; Provine and Doty, 2011; Reid et al, 2005; Zatz and Smith, 2012). 
While much of the noteworthy immigration and crime research has been cross-sectional, 
theoretically-driven studies conducted at every level of analysis have led to overwhelming 
evidence that increases in the immigrant population have either an inverse or null effect on crime 
(see National Academies, 2015; Ousey and Kubrin, 2017 for reviews). Yet, as Ousey and Kubrin 
remind us in their recent (2017) review, there are many aspects of the immigration-crime 
literature that have rarely been studied, leaving conclusions somewhat tentative.  
DISAGGREGATING BY ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL ORIGIN 
The lion’s share of studies on immigration and crime have used pan-ethnic measures of 
immigration such as the percentage of foreign-born in the community, the percent of the 
community population that self-identifies as Hispanic/Latin@, the percent of the community 
population that does not speak English well or at all, or a measure that combines some of these 
indicators into an immigration index (Desmond and Kubrin, 2009; Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012; 
Lee and Martinez, 2002; Lee et al, 2001; Martinez, 2000; Martinez et al., 2004; 2008; Morenoff 
and Sampson, 1997; Nielsen et al., 2005; Ramey, 2013; Stowell and Martinez, 2007). However, 
the use of pan-ethnic measures misses two key issues in immigration and crime research. First, 
pan-ethnic measures (percent foreign-born) do not address differential effects of the 
Hispanic/Latin@ and non-Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant populations on community crime. Second, 
a pan-ethnic foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ measure does not recognize variations in the 
Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population by nation of origin (Bursik, 2009; Rumbaut, 2009). As 
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Rumbaut (2009) asserts: “Although a single label implies otherwise, ‘Hispanics’ or ‘Latinos’ are 
not a homogenous entity and should not be presumed to be so” (Rumbaut, 2009:18). Treating this 
large foreign-born group as if they are united by shared experiences, traditions and language may 
miss the heterogeneity of this population and miss how changes in the foreign-born 
Hispanic/Latin@ population by nation of origin may differentially influence changes in 
community violent crime.  
REASONS TO EXPECT ETHNIC VARIATION IN COMMUNITY CRIME EFFECTS  
Throughout criminological and sociological studies on the influence of immigrant 
populations on crime, there are noted differences between immigrant groups who settle in U.S. 
communities, and there are theoretical reasons to expect ethnic variation in immigrant population 
effects on crime. Some of the differences between incoming migrant populations include: the 
reason(s) for migration (i.e., voluntary or involuntary, like those who migrate as refugees or 
asylum seekers forced to leave their home nation versus those who intentionally choose to leave 
their home country), and the contexts of reception that immigrant groups encounter once in the 
United States (Kubrin, Hipp and Kim, 2016). Empirical findings suggest two mechanisms that 
may work to fuel differences between immigrant ethnic groups and differential crime effects in 
communities.  
The first mechanism commonly discussed is immigrant self-selection (Tonry, 1997). 
Immigrant groups that have, traditionally, chosen to migrate to the United States absent coercion 
from their home government or threat to their life and family from political/social conflict, are 
likely to hold more human capital and skills that are desirable in the labor market where they 
settle (Bauer, Lofstrom, Zimmerman, 2001). Further, self-selecting migrants are more likely to 
have made a thoughtfully, calculated, decision to leave their home country to experience more 
upward social mobility than what they could expect in their home nation (Bauer, et al., 2001). 
Thus, communities with immigrant populations who make the intentional investment to migrate 
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and are motivated to achieve upward social mobility, benefit from population change that 
increases crime controlling mechanisms such as the proportion of the population tied to the 
workforce, residents actively building social networks and social capital.  
The second mechanism underlying the reason to expect that there may be differences 
between immigrant populations by ethnicity is community context of reception. Prior to the 1965 
Immigration Act, U.S. immigration policy carefully dictated and controlled the number of 
migrants coming to the United States from very select nations (i.e., Eastern Europe, some parts of 
Asia) (Martin, 2010). Certainly, the U.S. has a long legacy of anti-immigrant sentiment (Cottrell 
and Neuberg, 2005; Salinas, 2007); however, lighter-skinned, English-speaking immigrant 
experiences today are not only different from those in the early 20th century, but they are different 
from the experiences of darker-skinned, Hispanic/Latin@, Spanish-speaking immigrants (Ferraro, 
2014; Flores, 2017). After the Bracero program1 of 1942 that resulted in a large U.S. population 
increase of male, documented and undocumented, Mexican immigrant farm workers, the 1965 
Immigration Act intentionally opened legal migration opportunities for family members affected 
by the Bracero program to join those already working and residing in U.S. communities. 
However, one consequence of the Bracero program, and the subsequent relaxation of migration 
quotas from Mexico and other Hispanic/Latin@ nations, was an increase in the darker-skinned, 
Spanish-speaking immigrant population who were often low-skilled, transient, manual laborers 
with little education (Mize, 2006). Therefore, although immigrants from Hispanic/Latin@ nations 
                                                     
1 The Bracero program, established and implemented between Mexico and the U.S. shortly after World 
War II, allowed Mexico to “loan” male Mexican citizens to the United States to provide non-unionized, 
inexpensive labor for large agricultural operations. While the agreement, initiated by the U.S., included 
written agreements to protect the Bracero workers, over time most protections (i.e., fair pay, safe and 
sanitary housing) were not enforced and were intentionally violated by many farm owners as they sought to 
coerce their migrant workers into labor intensive work for long hours to increase profits. Further, during the 
Bracero era (1942-1964) millions of Mexican men entered the U.S. as farm laborers; however, due to poor 
regulation of incoming workers, estimates of equally large numbers of Mexican men entered the U.S. 
illegally and these men were not protected at all by the Bracero program. Thus the Bracero program, in 
effect, contributed to illegal migration, depressing unionization efforts of farm workers, unfair low wages 
for Mexican workers as well as poor living and unsafe working conditions (Mize, 2006). 
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to the United States quickly became one of the largest immigrant populations, their darker skin, 
use of foreign-language, and low economic status pushed them into the lower ranks of the U.S. 
ethnoracial hierarchy where they were constrained to disadvantaged communities, labeled and 
stereotyped as low-class, less-capable/worthy, “illegal” residents (Chavez, 2013; Ferraro, 2014). 
Further, recent research suggests that the prejudice and discrimination faced by many 
Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant populations in community schools, medical establishments, banks, 
and retail businesses can lead to social isolation that limits educational and workforce 
opportunities, contributes to physical and mental health disparities, as well as acts as a barrier to 
assimilation (Cohen and Chavez, 2013; Morey, 2018; Salas, Ayón, and Gurrola, 2013). 
Moreover, the social and economic isolation of Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants in a community can 
impede collective efficacy in the community thus threatening community safety.   
Differential results in the influence of immigrant groups by ethnicity and/or nation or 
origin on crime have been presented in some notable communities, immigration, and crime 
scholarship. For example, recent research has concluded that in some cities with predictable 
patterns of immigrant settlement, such as Miami, some Latin@ immigrant (Nicaraguan, 
Honduran, Cuban) population increases in a community contribute to a statistically significant 
decrease in homicide while increases in other immigrant groups (Haitian) do not (Stowell and 
Martinez, 2007; 2009). Stowell and Martinez (2007) found that, in Houston, immigration 
increases by predominant ethnic groups (Mexican, Salvadoran, Vietnamese and Chinese) had no 
influence on violent crime; this finding led them to conclude that research should not assume a 
negative association between immigration and crime (Stowell and Martinez; 2007).  
Disaggregating the foreign-born population by contributing world regions, Kubrin and 
colleagues (2016) found that in Southern California, communities with a higher percentage of 
immigrants from Latin world regions (Mexico, Central America, South America and New World) 
had higher violent crime than communities with a higher percentage of Black or Asian 
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immigrants. Using a dynamic approach, this dissertation examines how changes (2009-2000) in 
the foreign-born population of a community, disaggregated by ethnicity, and changes (2009-
2000) in the foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, disaggregated by nation of 
origin, relate to changes in community violent crime. The goal of this dissertation is to examine 
how ethnicity contributes to our understanding of immigration and crime; the current work will 
build on much of the cross-sectional and pan-ethnic research by looking at change in immigration 
and crime over time while unpacking the idea of ethnic heterogeneity within the foreign-born 
population. 
Research Questions (1): How does change in the percent Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born 
population, from 2000-2009 affect change in community violent crime rates (2000-
2012)? (2): How does change in the percent Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population, 
disaggregated by nation of origin, (2000-2009) affect change in community violent crime 
rates (2000-2012)?  
ETHNORACIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF IMMIGRANTS AND ETHNORACIAL 
NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT 
There are theoretical reasons that disaggregating the foreign-born population by ethnicity, 
and nation of origin may lead to differential crime results at a community level. First, the United 
States is characterized by a racial regime that influences access to resources and conventional 
opportunities based on socially constructed conceptualizations of race and ethnicity. Race, in the 
United States, is largely defined by phenotypical characteristics such as skin color, hair texture, 
eye shape etc. Ethnicity is very broadly defined in much of the sociological literature as shared 
ancestry, identity, language, tradition, and beliefs (ASA, 2017). A large body of research has 
noted community structural differences by predominant ethnoracial types (see Peterson and 
Krivo, 2012 and Ramey, 2013 for a review) that differentially affect opportunities for, and 
likelihood of, crime. 
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In their research on communities across the United States, Peterson and Krivo (2012) 
found such extreme racial disparity between communities that “there are few—if any—white 
neighborhoods as poor as the poorest black neighborhoods” (Hagan, 2012:xvii). Further, they 
find that racial and ethnic segregation exists along a socio-economic and crime continuum with 
predominantly Latin@ communities situated between predominantly white and Black 
neighborhoods (Peterson and Krivo, 2012).  Compared to the predominantly white European 
immigrants of the 19th century, most immigrants who have emigrated to the U.S. in recent 
decades are from Latin nations; as such, the physical appearance of immigrants, as well as 
languages and customs associated with their various nations of origin have changed. Ramey 
(2013) used a multi-level framework to examine how the racial regime milieu structured the 
changes in community violent crime within the cities and neighborhoods where there had been 
growth or decline in the foreign-born population2 (1995-2000). He found that in established 
destination cities, like Chicago, white and integrated neighborhoods where there was growth in 
the foreign-born population experienced lower violent crime rates; however, in predominantly 
African American or Latin@ neighborhoods, immigrant population growth had a null effect on 
crime (Ramey, 2013).  
The differential findings in the effect of an increasing immigrant population on 
community crime rates by ethnoracial community type is likely related to the segregated 
communities where some immigrants settle. As Ferraro (2014) notes, there are some differences 
between immigrants today and immigrants in the early 19th century: “The first is skin color. 
Generally, the darker the skin color of the incoming group, the more likely it is that members will 
be ascribed a lower social status” (Ferraro, 2014:64). Immigrants of color may be confined to 
lower-income, lower-status areas that have resulted from the U.S. racial-spatial divide. The 
ethnoracial characteristics of some immigrants, and their constrained neighborhood choices due 
                                                     
2 Measured as absolute growth or decline in the proportion of a census tract that was born outside the United States 
(Ramey, 2013). 
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to race and ethnicity may contribute to the differential effects of immigrant population changes on 
crime found in previous studies (Kubrin et al., 2016; Ramey, 2013; Stowell and Martinez 2007, 
2009). To better understand why immigrant growth had an inverse effect on crime in some 
communities but not others, the current work will build on Ramey’s (2013) community-level 
analyses by examining the effect of ethnicity (Hispanic/Latin@ and non-Hispanic/Latin@) of 
foreign-born population changes on violent crime. Moreover, this dissertation will explore the 
impact of foreign-born population changes by ethnicity (i.e., Hispanic foreign-born versus non-
Hispanic foreign-born) on changes in neighborhood violent crime rates across neighborhoods that 
vary in their predominant ethnoracial compositions. 
Further, beyond ethnicity of the immigrant population, immigrant status itself matters. 
Communities where immigrants settle vary in their willingness or ability to allow recent 
immigrants access to resources for social mobility, as well as vary in opportunities for crime 
(Chavez, 2013). In predominantly Latin@ communities, as in predominantly Black or white 
communities, the nation of origin of incoming foreign-born groups may introduce ethnic 
heterogeneity not evident when the foreign-born population is treated as homogenous. Chavez 
(2013) posits that in the United States, public fears related to immigration are due to what he 
terms the “Latino Threat”. Chavez (2013) argues that Latin@s differ from past immigrants due to 
a U.S. obsession with labeling Mexicans (native and immigrant) as illegal members of society 
and therefore criminal, uneducated, incapable of assimilating and undeserving of citizenship; 
such stereotypes fueled by the media and politicians often cast an undesirable light on Latin@ 
immigrants from any nation of origin (Chavez, 2013).  However, despite the stereotypes of 
Latin@ immigrants, within the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population there are differences in 
physical characteristics, national identity, language and customs by nation of origin that may 
contribute to different community choices for settlement and later integration/assimilation 
outcomes.  
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Disaggregating the foreign-born population by ethnicity and the foreign-born 
Hispanic/Latin@ population by nation of origin are logical steps toward better understanding the 
influence of ethnicity in community-level immigration and crime research. Moreover, the social 
structure and related ethnoracial structure of the community may encourage or limit successful 
immigrant integration therefore strengthening or weakening community mechanisms known to 
inhibit crime. The current work extends Kubrin and colleague’s (2016) and Ramey’s (2013) 
studies by examining the ethnicity of foreign-born populations and further disaggregating the 
immigrant Hispanic/Latin@ populations by nation of origin in the analyses of changes in 
community violent crime. Disaggregation of the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population 
contributes to our contemporary theoretical understanding of ethnic heterogeneity in communities 
by reflecting recent changes in U.S. communities’ population diversity. Examining community 
population changes over time, the influence of immigration in segregated neighborhoods 
(measured by predominant ethnoracial type of the community population; for example, Black, 
white, Hispanic, minority or integrated), and ethnic heterogeneity of the foreign-born population 
in communities and crime studies will open new avenues for research on the influence of modern-
day immigration on crime. 
Research Questions (3): How do the effects of changes (2000-2009) in the immigrant 
population of Hispanic/Latin@ by nation of origin and non-Hispanic/Latin@) on 
changes in community violent crime rates (2000-2012) vary by ethnoracial neighborhood 
type? (4) How does change (2000-2000) in the percent Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born 
population, disaggregated by nation of origin, affect change in community violent crime 
rates (2000-2012)? 
GENERAL OVERVIEW & ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY 
Using data on violent crime measured by reports of murder and robbery known to police 
within Chicago communities (2000 & 2012) from the National Neighborhood Crime Study I and 
II (2000, 2012), Decennial Census Summary File 3 (SF 3) and census tract data from the 
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American Community Survey (ACS; 2006-2009) this dissertation uses a dynamic approach to 
examine changes in the community immigrant population by ethnicity on changes in community 
violent crime. The current work focuses on change in violent crime due to the jurisdictional 
similarities of violent crime definitions and victims’ likelihood to report violent victimization. 
Recent comparisons between police-reported crime statistics and self-report victimization 
statistics suggest that between 2000 and 2010 roughly 60% to 66% of all violent crime incidents 
were reported to police; simple assaults (about 50% were reported to police) and property crime 
(roughly 40% to 43% were reported to police) incidents went largely unreported (Langton, 
Berzofky, Krebs and Smiley-McDonald, 2012). Langton and colleagues (2012) posit that assaults 
and property crimes are less-likely to come to the attention of police in communities with 
concentrated disadvantage, and/or where there are poor police-community relations (Langton, et. 
al., 2012). Moreover, in communities with large Hispanic/Latin@, Black and immigrant 
populations, crime reporting may be even lower (specifically in reporting property crime and 
simple assault) due to distrust of law enforcement/criminal justice system and/or fear of 
deportation (Davis and Henderson, 2003; Messing, Becerra, Ward-Lasher, and Androff, 2015). 
Therefore, because communities with changing immigrant populations are likely to suffer from 
varying levels of disadvantage, and knowing that predominantly Black, Hispanic/Latin@ as well 
as immigrant populations are less likely to report assault and property crimes, the current work 
ensures the most reliable findings on changes in immigration and crime relationships by only 
including measures of violent crime. 
To examine the dynamic nature of community populations, community structure and 
crime, this dissertation returns to Chicago- the home of early, urban, ecological, crime research. 
Not only is there a considerable amount of previous, theoretically-guided empirical work on 
crime in Chicago communities (dating back to Shaw and McKay’s (1942) conceptualization of 
social disorganization theory), Chicago remains an economically and ethnoracially diverse city 
that has, consistently, maintained community-level demographic and crime data. Moreover, 
  
10 
 
communities in Chicago have a long history with immigrants from various nations of origin 
(Paral, 2003) and, as such, it has less predictable patterns of immigrant settlement and may be 
less limited in the nations represented by its changing immigrant populations. 
The examination of the relationship between changes in immigrant populations by 
ethnicity on community crime within the context of ethnoracial community composition proceeds 
as follows. Chapter Two presents a theoretical and empirical overview of immigration and crime 
situated within the context of the community; it begins with theoretically guided research that 
finds a protective effect of immigrant population increases followed by theoretical reasons to 
expect differential crime effects in communities where there are immigrant population increases 
disaggregated by ethnicity and Latin nation of origin. Chapter Three provides a detailed 
discussion of the data used in the current study, variable operationalizations, and outlines the 
dynamic analytical methods that will be used to conduct hypothesis testing. Chapter Four first 
presents the descriptive and bivariate results across and between the variables included in this 
study, followed by the results of the regression models and hypothesis tests. Finally, Chapter Five 
discusses the implications of the results, contributions of the current work to community-level 
immigration and crime research, as well as potential avenues for better understanding the role of 
ethnicity measures in examining immigration and crime research.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW OF 
IMMIGRATION AND CRIME IN THE COMMUNITY 
 
Immigration and crime research at the community level has been guided primarily by 
social ecology, social disorganization, and systemic theories. Some of the earliest community-
level research employed cartographic techniques and resulted in two primary conclusions. First, 
crime and delinquency do not occur randomly across space; crime and delinquency tend to occur 
more in some areas than others (Park and Burgess, 1924; Shaw and McKay, 1942). Second, areas 
with higher crime and delinquency rates display similar structural characteristics; areas with 
lower crime and delinquency rates also have similar structural characteristics yet their structural 
characteristics differ from those in areas with higher crime and delinquency (Shaw and McKay, 
1942). Further, classical social ecology and social disorganization theory posit that city residents 
will live in the best area that they can afford and, as residents’ economic situations improve, 
residents will relocate to a more desirable area- the most desirable areas not only have fewer signs 
of disorder, but they also have less crime. This type of residential mobility tends to occur in what 
Burgess defined as “concentric zones” (Burgess, 1925). By the 1940s, on the heels of Park and 
Burgess’ (1924) ecological research in Chicago, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay’s (1942) 
examinations of Chicago communities suggested that there were concentrations of male 
delinquency in the central business district and zone of transition. Shaw and McKay conclude: 
The high degree of consistency in the association between delinquency and other 
characteristics of the community not only sustains the conclusion that delinquent 
behavior is related dynamically to the community but also appears to establish that all 
community characteristics, including delinquency, are products of the operation of 
general processes more or less common to American cities…delinquency-producing 
factors are inherent in the community (1942:193). 
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Therefore, the causal logic of the classical social disorganization theory suggests that, where 
immigrant populations tend to settle, changes in crime are the result of various community 
conditions that contextualize immigrant settlement- crime changes are not influenced by various 
immigrant population groups themselves.  
CHANGES IN COMMUNITY STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, AND CHANGES IN CRIME 
At the heart of community-level crime research is the idea that places are dynamic and 
changes within a neighborhood can affect changes in community crime. Classical social 
disorganization theory posits that communities with high levels of: economic disadvantage, 
residential mobility, and an ethnoracially diverse population (ethnic heterogeneity) will be unable 
to exert the social controls necessary to control/prevent crime (Kornhauser, 1978; Martinez, 2002; 
Ramey, 2013; Stowell, 2007; Shaw and McKay, 1942). Historically, the concept of ethnic 
heterogeneity has been measured using the percent of a community that identifies as foreign-born. 
As noted in Stowell (2007), “a central tenet of disorganization theory is the belief that 
immigration will have a deleterious impact on the social order of neighborhoods” (Stowell, 
2007:95). Although this measure has been consistently used in communities and crime literature 
as one way to indicate the level of social (dis)organization in an area, using the percent foreign-
born as a proxy measure for ethnic heterogeneity neglects ethnoracial variation within both the 
native and foreign-born community populations.  
For decades, sociological and criminological scholars have examined social 
disorganization as an explanation for crime and research has been devoted to uncovering the 
mechanisms in disorganized communities that contribute to crime variation across place 
(Bordura, 1958; Bursik and Webb, 1982; Bursik, 1984; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Chilton and 
Dussich, 1974; Gordon, 1967; Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974; Kornhauser, 1978; Lander, 1954; 
Wirth, 1938; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Shaw and McKay, 1942). In their study on 
neighborhoods and crime, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) found that residents in 
disorganized communities tend to keep to themselves and are therefore less attached to other 
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residents in the neighborhood as well as less willing to intervene when they witness crime 
occurring in the community (low collective efficacy). Sampson and colleagues (1997) posit that 
this low collective efficacy contributes to crime by leaving residents in disadvantaged 
communities, absent effective social control, free to commit crime.  
CHANGES IN COMMUNITIES’ FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION, REVITALIZATION, AND 
CRIME 
Early research on the effects of immigration increases on crime suggested that movement 
of large numbers of immigrants into a community contributed to increased poverty, a larger 
population with low levels of formal education, fewer residents employed in professional 
occupations, linguistic isolation, and political powerlessness (Martinez, 2002). These changes, 
from a classical social disorganization perspective would predict increases in community crime 
rates. Yet, despite the deleterious structural characteristics, crime is much lower than social 
disorganization theory would predict (Browning, 2002; Desmond and Kubrin, 2009; Lauritsen 
2001; Lee et al., 2001)– this departure from social structural causes of crime and reported crime 
in immigrant Latin@ enclaves is referred to as “The Latino Paradox” or “immigration effect”. 
There is reason to believe that increased immigration into a community, specifically communities 
suffering from disadvantage, encourages crime to decrease by strengthening collective values and 
increasing social control through changes in social institutions such as family, education, 
government and the economy. 
One framework used to explain this “paradox” phenomenon argues that many immigrants 
are ambitious, hard-working, and subscribe to conventional, mainstream ideals/norms (Butcher 
and Piehl, 1995; Tonry, 1997). In other words, not just anyone who wishes to migrate to the 
United States can do so successfully; the immigrant population is a self-selected group with drive 
and the perseverance necessary for success in a new social world (Feliciano and Lanuza, 2017). 
In fact, recent scholarship by Feliciano and Lanuza (2017) suggests that despite initial 
socioeconomic struggles, the successes and beneficial community outcomes of immigrants and 
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the immigrant population should not be considered paradoxical at all. Feliciano and Lanuza 
(2017) note that: “Migrants who change structural locations after moving to the United States 
nevertheless bring with them cultural skills, dispositions, beliefs, and aspirations associated with 
their previous class status” (Feliciano and Lanuza, 2017:215). They further argue that the 
“immigrant paradox” is evidence of recent immigrants re-establishing themselves into a U.S. 
social class comparable to the class they left behind in their home country. Such findings echo 
studies that suggest many recent immigrants often come to the United States with higher levels 
(or at least comparable levels) of education than the average native-born American, as well as the 
economic and social resources necessary for making such a complex move (Alba and Nee, 1997; 
Ousey and Kubrin, 2009; National Academies, 2015). 
In addition to the immigrant self-selection perspective, the immigrant revitalization 
perspective (Feldmeyer, 2009; Lee et al., 2001, Martinez, 2002; Martinez et al., 2004) suggests 
that immigrant concentration in a community influences crime rate decreases, or crime 
prevention, in two primary ways. First, the presence of immigrants in a community strengthens 
community social organization (Chinchilla, Hamilton and Loucky, 1993; Ley, 2008; Martinez et 
al, 2004; Theodore and Martin, 2007). Research on the number and strength of social ties among 
immigrants is mixed; however, some empirical works find that many first-generation immigrants 
have more social support and larger social networks after migrating to the U.S. than later 
generations (Landale and Oropesa, 2001; Ousey and Kubrin, 2009; Vertovec, 2003, 2004). 
Further, unlike previous generations and waves of immigration to the United States, immigrants 
today are better able to maintain contact with friends and relatives in their home country, thereby 
maintaining social control through an increasingly advanced telecommunication network 
(Vertovec, 2004). Vertovec’s (2003) research on the influence of communication technologies on 
recent migrants led him to suggest that,  
Whereas in previous eras migrants had to make do with exorbitantly expensive calls or 
slow-paced post, they are now able to communicate with their families abroad on a 
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regular, if not day-to-day basis. This obviously has considerable impact on domestic and 
community-life, inter-generational and gender relations, religious and other cultural 
practices, and local economic development in both migrant sending and migrant-
receiving contexts (Vertovec, 2004: 220). 
Such technological advances naturally reduce the types of social isolation experienced by 
some of the earliest waves of immigrants (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1920) and negate the social 
problems associated with severed ties between new immigrants and their established social 
networks. Moreover, family and neighbor cohesion in networks within host communities operate 
to provide informal social control (Martinez et al., 2004; Morenoff et. al., 2001; Portes and Zhou, 
1993). Martinez and colleagues (2004) posit that ethnically heterogenous communities often have 
dense social tie networks where recent immigrants and their families are offered educational, 
occupational and other types of support systems that promote successful integration. They note 
that increases in social capital for new immigrants may help buffer the criminogenic risks of 
some of the communities in which they settle (Martinez et al., 2004). 
Contemporary immigrant communities are often characterized by the presence of two-
parent families and strong ties with family members as well as neighbors and other social 
institutions in the community (Vélez and Lyons, 2012); this suggests an increase in collective 
efficacy in communities where immigrant concentration is high. Portes and Zhou (1993) note that 
the influx of immigrants into the U.S. in the twentieth century has evolved into immigration of 
families to the U.S. rather than the immigration of older, single adults that was commonplace in 
the nineteenth century. Immigrant women in the new millennium have also changed considerably 
compared to immigrant women who immigrated in the nineteenth century. The Pew Hispanic 
Center and The Panel on The Integration of Immigrants into American Society both report that 
immigrant women in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries are young adults and have higher 
fertility rates than native women (Passel and Taylor, 2010; National Academies, 2015). Family 
structure and the presence of young children in a community are important components for both 
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informal social control as well as the strengthening of social capital. Ousey and Kubrin (2009) 
examined changes in immigration (measured using a three-item immigration index) on city 
violent crime rate (1980-2000). Their results suggest that increased immigration in a city 
contributes to declines in violent crime because this demographic change strengthens the 
institution of family in the city by decreasing divorce rates and increasing two-parent families 
(Ousey and Kubrin, 2009). 
Further, although foreign-born residents tend to be disproportionately underrepresented in 
local government and political organizations, there is some evidence that immigrant families with 
children in school do get involved and perhaps create bridges to the larger political economy 
(National Academies, 2015). Terriquez and Kwon (2014) found that children in immigrant 
families who are being educated in U.S. schools are not only likely to become registered voters 
themselves, but they may take what they learn in school about participation in local organization 
and politics home to their parents (Terriquez and Kwon, 2014). Similarly, Bloemraad and Trost, 
(2008) found that immigrant school children often encourage their immigrant parents to become 
active and join in immigrant rights’ demonstrations (Bloemraad and Trost, 2008). Finally, 
immigrant participation in the institution of religion offers even more opportunity for joining 
social networks that inform recent immigrants about potential jobs, opportunities for civic 
engagement, and emotional support (Foley and Hoge, 2007; Hirschman, 2004). 
Another avenue through which immigrant concentration in a community aids in social 
organization is through the stimulation and bolstering of the local economy and in redevelopment 
of the city’s urban center (Sampson, 2008; Vélez 2009). Recent findings by the Panel of the 
Integration of Immigrants into American Society note that although the earnings of immigrants 
remain lower than earnings of the native-born, the immigrant population overall has a high level 
of employment in the low-skilled labor market relative to the native-born population (National 
Academies, 2015). Research by Reid and colleagues (2005) suggests that an influx of immigrants 
into a community may reverse the effects of depopulation in a community thereby stimulating the 
  
17 
 
local economy and encouraging business capital to remain in, or re-invest in, the community. 
Further, ethnic enclave research focuses on communities with large numbers of immigrants who 
contribute to the community’s broad division of labor and who have enough social capital to both 
create jobs in the community and offer higher pay for their employees (Portes and Zhou, 1993). 
Although residents in these enclaves may lack financial security and disposable income, the 
majority are involved in the local labor market- they are working and are attached to the broader 
labor market. 
Attachment to the conventional labor market and lower levels of jobless residents are 
recognized indicators of social integration that make participation in crime a less attractive and 
less lucrative option (Martinez, 2002).  Reid and colleagues’ (2005) study of 150 U.S. 
metropolitan areas, using data from Decennial Census and Uniform Crime Report, led them to 
suggest that contrary to public rhetoric suggesting that immigrants “take” jobs from the native-
born, an influx of immigrants into an metropolitan area: 
creates a population to be served both by the public and private sector, a large immigrant 
population may actually produce better jobs for native-born persons. Hence native-born 
minority group members may be promoted into higher-paying jobs as immigration 
increases because immigrants do not only ‘take’ jobs, they also ‘make’ jobs that the 
native-born obtain” (Reid et al., 2005:776). 
Vélez’s (2009) research on homicide rates in Chicago census tracts (1993-1995) led her to 
conclude that: “ethnic economies are no doubt strengthened with the infusion of immigrants who 
both consume ethnic goods and services as well as find employment opportunities in their 
production” (Vélez, 2009: 333). 
In sum, there are theoretical reasons to believe that changes in a community’s immigrant 
population can affect crime. Moreover, as immigrants in the community begin to navigate U.S. 
social life, the strengthening of community institutions facilitates crime control by defending 
neighborhood interests through creating and organizing activities focused on providing youth 
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activities, creating neighbor networks, supporting relationships between community members and 
conventional institutions outside the community (Ley, 2008). However, it is not clear if the 
revitalizing effect of increases in the immigrant population of a community are generalizable to 
all immigrant groups. That is, we know less about how the ethnicity of immigrant population 
groups might differentially affect the relationships between immigration and crime. 
IMMIGRANT POPULATION CHANGES BY HISPANIC/LATIN@, NON-HISPANIC/LATIN@ 
AND CRIME 
The U.S. immigrant population is a diverse group, and although migration from Mexico 
and other Latin nations increased significantly after the 1965 Immigration Act, there are 
numerous nations of origin represented in the U.S. foreign-born population. As recently as 2015, 
the U.S. Census reported that there were 43.2 million foreign-born residents (roughly 13.4% of 
the U.S. population) in the United States (Lopez and Bialik, 2017). Further, the majority of 
immigrants in the U.S. (2000-2010) migrated from Mexico, India, China and Canada (Lopez and 
Bialik, 2017).  
There is historical evidence that U.S. residents of Mexican or other Latin ancestry 
recognized the social barriers and exclusion based on the United States’ phenotypical social 
hierarchy; in fact, as Moore (2008) notes “Mexican Americans rejected the term minority, and its 
implied association with black America” (Moore, 2008:xx). This rejection led to the eventual 
adaptation of an ethnic designation in the U.S. Decennial Census in 1970 allowing residents to 
select a race as well as self-identify their ethnicity as Hispanic or Latino. By 2000, residents in 
the United States were able to self-identify as multiple races; yet, there is still only one officially 
recognized ethnicity - Hispanic/Latino. Some criminological research has examined how changes 
in the Hispanic population affects changes in community crime. Martinez (2002) examined 
differential community characteristics of areas where Hispanic and non-Hispanic immigrants 
settled across five cities (Miami, El Paso, San Diego, Chicago and Houston). He argued that in 
the cities examined, the Hispanic population was disproportionately comprised of foreign-born 
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Hispanics; he did not, however, disaggregate the Hispanic population by foreign-born status. In 
his longitudinal analyses (1980-1995), Martinez concluded that the Hispanic homicide 
victimization rate fell between the rates for non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic Black 
populations despite Hispanics and non-Hispanic Blacks living in structurally similar communities 
across all five cities.  
However, in a recent report published by the U.S. Census (2017), the percent of the U.S. 
population who self-identified as Hispanic was 57.5 million (Census, 2017). Further, using 
American Community Survey population data, the Pew Research Center reported that as recently 
as 2012, 64.5% of U.S. Hispanic residents were native-born and 35.5% were foreign-born (Brown 
and Patten, 2014). Therefore, it is warranted to limit investigations on changes in 
Hispanic/Latin@ immigration and crime to the foreign-born Hispanic population and exclude the 
native-born Hispanic population from the foreign-born Hispanic measure. To better understand 
the relationship between changes in the immigrant population in Chicago communities, 
community composition, community characteristics and crime, the current dissertation will 
examine community changes where there were changes in the Hispanic and non-Hispanic/Latin@ 
foreign-born populations. 
Hypothesis (1): In Chicago communities where there are increases (2009-2000) in the 
Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, there will be decreases (2012-2000) in the communities’ 
violent crime rates.  
Hypothesis (2): In Chicago communities where there are increases (2009-2000) in the non-
Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, there will be decreases (2012-2000) in the communities’ 
violent crime rates. 
CHANGES IN THE HISPANIC/LATIN@ IMMIGRANT POPULATION BY NATION OF ORIGIN 
AND CRIME 
 
Like the idea that there are differences in the immigrant population by Hispanic/Latin@ 
and non- Hispanic/Latin@ ethnicity, there is also heterogeneity within the Hispanic/Latin@ 
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population. Stowell (2007) notes: “The fact that ethnic populations reside in areas with varying 
levels of disadvantage suggests that the association between immigration and crime may differ as 
a product of ethnicity” (Stowell, 2007:78). In his study on immigration and crime patterns, 
Stowell (2007) confirmed that across three cities (Alexandria, Virginia, Houston, Texas, and 
Miami, Florida) neighborhood crime rates and social structure characteristics varied across each 
city; further, he found that immigrant settlement patterns by immigrant ethnicity (Hispanic by 
predominant nation of origin, and African by predominant nation of origin) also varied across 
neighborhoods with structurally dissimilar levels of disorganization (Stowell, 2007). Moreover, 
he found that immigrants tended to live in communities with fewer home-owners, a larger recent 
immigrant population, a smaller non-white population, and many lived in communities that were 
more economically disadvantaged than what was found in predominantly native-born resident 
communities. Stowell’s (2007) conclusions highlight the need for criminological scholars to 
disaggregate the foreign-born population and discontinue assuming uniformity in immigration 
and crime patterns (Stowell, 2007). Similar observations have been made in southern California 
cities in which the foreign-born population was disaggregated by world-regions (Kubrin et al., 
2016).  
The current dissertation focuses on immigrant population changes and the effect of such 
changes in Chicago communities, where there are many Hispanic/Latin@ and non-
Hispanic/Latin@ nations represented in the immigrant population. Within criminological research 
on immigration and crime, some studies disaggregated the Hispanic/Latino immigrant population. 
Using data on Miami neighborhoods and police reports, Stowell and Martinez (2009) examined 
the influence of immigrant populations from Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti and Cuba on homicide. 
They found that Latin@ immigrant groups settle in communities that are insulated from violence 
compared to their non-Latin@ counterparts. Further, they found that Latin@ immigrant group 
population concentrations had a statistically significant, negative impact on homicide (Stowell 
and Martinez, 2009). The choice to examine Miami neighborhoods and prominent immigrant 
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groups in Miami by nation of origin is important for better understanding how immigrants carve-
out their own unique spaces in the U.S. city as well as for understanding if crime is related to 
immigration. However, these studies are limited to cities with “predictable patterns of settlement” 
and a limited number of immigrant groups (Stowell and Martinez, 2009) such as Los Angeles, 
Miami, Houston and San Antonio (Stowell and Martinez, 2007; Stowell and Martinez, 2009). 
Further, using data on a port city with such a long history of accepting very specific immigrant 
groups is likely not generalizable to other cities that may have an equally long history of 
immigrant settlement from an array of other nations;  yet, their (2007) findings in a similar study 
in Houston and Miami (disaggregating the foreign-born into Nicaraguan, Honduran, Cuban and 
Haitian in Miami and Mexican El Salvadorian, Chinese and Vietnamese in Houston) paved the 
way for subsequent immigration crime studies as well as the current work. 
Recent scholarship has investigated violent crime in neighborhoods with, or surrounded 
by, predominantly immigrant residents. Kubrin and Ishizawa (2012) examined Chicago and Los 
Angeles neighborhood violent crime (homicide and robbery) in immigrant neighborhoods. They 
measured immigrant neighborhoods as clusters of neighborhoods situated within areas of greater 
immigrant presence and found that Chicago immigrant neighborhoods had half the violent crime 
of immigrant neighborhoods in Los Angeles. Kubrin and Ishizawa (2012) suggested comparing 
the characteristics of the immigrant neighborhoods both within and across cities while taking into 
consideration the neighborhoods’ historical contexts. Perhaps one reason that there were such 
stark differences between the crime rates in the neighborhoods examined in each city is because 
their immigrant concentration measure used both a pan-ethnic (percent Latino) and pan-foreign-
born (percent foreign-born) measure (Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012) rather than disaggregating the 
immigrants by nation of origin. Although the percent Latino measure and percent foreign-born 
measures in each city are highly correlated due to the increased wave of immigration from 
Mexico and other Latin nations (Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012), these measures may obscure 
important differences in how immigrants from various Latin nations are accepted into 
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communities as well as the community structures of each community where immigrants from 
various nations settle. 
Within the pan-ethnic Hispanic/Latin@ population in Chicago, there are at least 23 
nations represented3; while certainly, the empirical choice to aggregate some of the nations of 
origin into world regions facilitates a larger population for statistical practice, this may mask 
cultural variations within the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population that affect community 
integration and limit the communities where immigrants may settle. As Rumbaut (2009) asserts: 
“Although a single label implies otherwise, ‘Hispanics’ or ‘Latinos’ are not a homogenous entity, 
and should not be presumed to be so” (Rumbaut, 2009:18). For example, sociolinguistic scholars 
who focus on understanding the various dialects of Spanish spoken in the United States highlight 
that variations in the U.S. Spanish languages can signal to other Spanish speakers’ social 
characteristics such as social class and level of education; differences in dialect can also lead to 
breakdowns in collective efficacy, misunderstanding and frustrations. 
Zentella (1990) examined Spanish dialect differences in New York city between Puerto 
Rican, Mexican, and Dominican Spanish speakers. She noted: “Among the groups that we 
studied, and in New York in general, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans are the poorest, the least 
educated, and the darkest Latinos in the city; they are discriminated against as individuals and as 
a group, and so is the variety of Spanish that they speak” (Zentella, 1990: 1102). Further, she 
explains “The fact that Cuban Spanish does not suffer the same wide-spread condemnation that is 
voiced against Puerto Rican and Dominican Spanish, despite its linguistic similarities, reveals the 
overriding power that social factors have in the face of linguistic ones” (Zentella, 1990). This is 
somewhat akin to the variations of English spoken throughout the United States. Word choice, 
inflection, and accents are often used by English speakers to make generalized assumptions about 
                                                     
3 The nations of origin in the foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ population include: Mexico, Puerto Rico (a U.S. territory), 
Cuba, The Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuelan, Spain, Other Central American Origin, 
Other South American Origin (Census, 2017). 
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those with whom they speak; however, among the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, 
dialectical contact differences may add yet another level of discrimination in the host community 
that immigrants may confront - one within the immigrant or native Spanish speaking population. 
Díaz-Campos and Navarro-Galisteo (2009) examined the perception of dialect variation 
within Spanish by native Spanish speakers in the United States. They found that Spanish 
speakers, without formal training in linguistics, were able to correctly categorize their own dialect 
as well as identify a talker’s nation of origin after listening to some sentences spoken in Spanish 
(Díaz-Campos and Navarro-Galisteo, 2009). Taken together, previous works suggest that 
investigating nation of origin as a characteristic of the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population 
and examining changes in various immigrant populations by nation of origin within community 
ethnoracial context may yield a better understanding of different immigration-crime results found 
in previous research.  
In their (2016) work, Kubrin, Hipp, and Kim used data from the Southern California 
Crime Study to address the limitation in much of the community-level immigration and crime 
literature created by treating the foreign-born population as homogenous (percent foreign-born). 
Kubrin and colleagues (2016) disaggregated the foreign-born population in Southern California 
by measuring Black and white immigrants from eighteen world regions of origin (see Kubrin et 
al., 2016). They found that communities with a high percentage of Latino immigrants had higher 
violent crime than communities with a higher percentage of Black or Asian immigrants; further, 
they argue that their findings suggest that disaggregating the immigrant population by nation of 
origin is the more appropriate way to measure the immigrant population in community and crime 
research. It may be useful to take this approach in studying the impact of immigration further by 
disaggregating the Latino immigrant population by specific nation of origin and thus examine 
patterns of community structure in settlement as well as nearby areas. Massey and Sánchez 
(2010) note that “immigrant assimilation is more complex than many Americans realize, and the 
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process is shaped by the actions of natives as much as by immigrants’ own actions” (Massey and 
Sánchez, 2010:2). 
Hypothesis (3): Where there are changes in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population by nation of 
origin (2000-2009), there will be an inverse effect of immigrant population change on community violent 
crime. 
IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS WITHIN THE U.S. ETHNORACIAL REGIME 
Ramey (2013) and Kubrin et al., (2016) both found differential effects of immigrant 
population growth on crime across communities disaggregated by predominant ethnoracial 
compositions. One reason that immigrants who have arrived in the United States since the 1965 
Immigration Act may fare differently than did earlier waves of immigrants is the current U.S. 
conceptualizations and functions of race and ethnicity in American society. As Ferraro (2014) 
notes, there are some differences between immigrants today and immigrants in the early 19th 
century. “The first is skin color. Generally, the darker the skin color of the incoming group, the 
more likely it is that members will be ascribed a lower social status” (Ferraro, 2014:64).  
The Panel on The Integration of Immigrants into American Society notes that many 
recent immigrants are introduced to their “ethnoracial identity” soon after arriving to the U.S., 
and this classification sticks with them as a status that becomes a part of their identity in U.S. 
institutions (education, government, economy etc…) (National Academies, 2015). Although the 
suggestion of an intersection between race, ethnicity, and social class is not new (see Shaw and 
McKay, 1942; Wilson, 1987 and Anderson, 1999 for discussions of this intersection and its 
relationship to crime), it is important to note that the physical (i.e., phenotypical such as skin 
tone, hair texture, facial feature) characteristics of many immigrants who have migrated since the 
1965 Immigration Act look differently than those who migrated prior to 1965. Such visible 
differences contribute to an immigrant’s ethnoracial identity and may limit or influence 
immigrants to settle in predominantly minority communities that have historically been 
communities affected by structural disadvantage (Ferraro, 2014). 
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Stowell and Martinez (2007) found that, depending on the prevalence of violence in 
surrounding communities, there was a decrease in crime where there were increases in the 
foreign-born Nicaraguan, Honduran, and Haitian populations; this was not found for the Cuban 
immigrant population in Miami (Stowell and Martinez, 2007). It may be that the Cuban 
population in Miami is more affected by the intersections of race and ethnicity than the other 
Latino groups that were included in the study, thus constraining their opportunities for successful 
integration devoid of crime. In Houston, Stowell and Martinez (2007) found no impact of 
immigration on violent crime; this result might have been influenced by the community context 
into which the immigrants settle beyond the city context of reception. 
In a study of the Dominican immigrant population growth in Reading, Pennsylvania 
(2006), Jensen and colleagues specifically examined how race and ethnicity intersected and 
influenced the community context of reception for the growing Dominican immigrant population. 
Using in-depth, open-ended survey techniques with a convenience sample of 65 Dominican-
origin adults, Jensen and colleagues found that newer arrivals recognized that their skin-color was 
“very dark” yet, due to their home-country’s (Dominican Republic) rejected use of the term 
Black, the newer immigrants chose to self-identify as Dominican and Hispanic/Latin@. They 
comment that “Several of our respondents did regard themselves as very dark skinned and 
recognized that they are sometimes regarded as black by members of the wider community” 
(Jensen et al., 2006:1098). Therefore, the perceptions and assumptions of native-born residents 
may constrain the community settlement choices for darker-skinned Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants 
and lead to very complex contexts of reception within the Hispanic/Latin@ and minority 
communities. Community structural characteristics where lighter or darker skinned immigrants 
settle may be missed in criminological works that examine only a pan-ethnic categorization of 
immigrants and assume uniformity across the Hispanic/Latin@ populations. Further, Jensen and 
colleagues (2006) found that immigrants who had resided in the U.S. for an extended period and 
who were lighter in skin tone were more likely to self-identify using a pan-ethnic 
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Hispanic/Latin@ designation and they also benefitted from higher socioeconomic status (i.e., 
better education, employed, higher income and home owners) (Jensen and colleagues, 2006). 
Jensen and colleagues’ (2006) finding offered support for Daniel’s (2002) assertion that 
the history of Hispanic/Latin@ and Mexican peoples in the United States provided some with the 
privileges associated with whiteness but excluded others. Mexican Americans residing in the U.S. 
in the late 1800’s were largely “multi-racial” by contemporary definitions of race. After the 1848 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, mestizos4 in the U.S. were guaranteed rights to citizenship and thus 
extended an official white identity; however, in practice, mestizos were not granted all the social 
privileges of whiteness, and only the lightest-skinned (elite) mestizos from Mexico were able to 
truly claim Spaniard (Castillian) ancestry (Daniel, 2002). This history is key to contextualizing 
Hispanic, Latin@ and Mexican people and communities in the United States. Multiple 
generations of lighter-skinned U.S. born Hispanics have been socially afforded more opportunity 
for upward social mobility that is closer to that experienced by Anglo Americans. In the modern 
U.S. ethnoracial regime of modern America, within the Hispanic/Latin@ ethnic designation, there 
are many who occupy positions of higher social status who, despite their own Mexican ancestry, 
set themselves apart from recent Mexican immigrants- and certainly apart from Latin@s who, 
historically, are a multi-racial combination of Spanish and African (therefore never considered 
European) descent. 
Immigrants with darker skin tones may face constrained opportunities for community 
settlement, and discrimination, due to the structure of the U.S. racial regime; this may explain 
why immigrant populations in predominantly Black communities have little to no effect on 
changes in crime. Either the immigrant populations settling in Black communities are too small to 
effectively influence change in crime, or, the immigrant population remain socially or 
economically isolated thus not contributing to community labor market improvements and/or 
                                                     
4 Defined, mestizo refers to the historical genetic mix of Native American and European ancestry. 
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collective efficacy. In his 2013 study, Ramey examined the effect of changes in the immigrant 
population of communities across 84 new and established immigrant destination cities. Using 
data from the National Neighborhood Crime Study 1990-2000 (NNCS I) and data from the 
National Neighborhood Crime Database (NCDB), Ramey investigated how immigrant population 
and immigrant composition (measured as percent foreign-born) influenced census tract violent 
crime rates across cities. Ramey further considered how immigrant growth and immigrant 
composition in tracts that were predominantly white, or black or Latino, affected violent crime 
rates (Ramey, 2013). He found that communities with a larger immigrant composition 
significantly predicted less violent crime in all neighborhood types except in predominantly Black 
communities (Ramey, 2013). Increases in immigrant composition (immigrant growth) 
significantly affected violent crime decreases in predominantly white and integrated communities 
(Ramey, 2013). Ultimately, Ramey concluded that immigrant revitalization (measured as 
decreases in violent crime) was contingent upon neighborhood type within the context of new or 
established destination cities. Following the work of Stowell (2007), Kubrin et al., (2016), and 
Ramey (2013), this dissertation will examine changes in Chicago communities’ violent crime 
(2012-2000) where there were changes in the immigrant population by ethnicity. 
Moreover, although the census now allows for a delineation between race and one 
ethnicity, there remains public, political, and to some extent academic, confusion/debate 
regarding ethnicity and social inclusion/exclusion. Ethnicity is very broadly defined in much of 
the sociological literature as shared ancestry, identity, language, tradition, and beliefs (ASA, 
2017). Yet, as Andreas Wimmer (2013) argues, defining ethnic groups is far more complex than 
simply assigning a social group a label based on the region of the world from which they (or their 
ancestors) originate and a population’s shared beliefs/practices. Rather, Wimmer states: “ethnicity 
is more than an ‘imagined community,’ a cognitive classification or a discourse of identity. 
Ethnic boundary making is driven by hierarchies of power and prestige and is meant to stabilize 
and institutionalize these hierarchies (see Tilly, 1998; Mackert, 2004)” (Wimmer, 2013). Further, 
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keeping Wimmer’s argument in mind, Bonilla-Silva notes that: “To maintain ‘white 
supremacy’…whites (1) create an intermediate racial group to buffer racial conflict, (2) allow 
some newcomers into the white racial strata, and (3) incorporate most immigrants into the 
collective black strata” (Bonilla-Silva, 2004:934). 
Bonilla-Silva asserts that many immigrants are assigned a low social status upon entering 
the United States, and he also suggests that this is not uniform across all groups of immigrants; 
therefore, there is reason to believe that some immigrant groups will fare better in communities 
and may contribute to community life differently than others. Regarding immigrant ethnicity, 
Chavez (2013) notes that Latino immigrants to the United States must navigate the Latino Threat 
narrative. He explains that the Latino Threat narrative  
works so well and is so pervasive precisely because its basic premises are taken for 
granted as true…Latinos, whether immigrant or U.S. born, are a homogenous population 
that somehow stands apart from normal processes of historical change. They are 
immutable and impervious to the influences of the larger society and thus are not 
characterized as experiencing social and cultural change. They are uneducated, 
monolingual Spanish speakers, segregated into ethnic enclaves. Because they lead 
separate social and linguistic lives, one must assume that they marry only their own kind. 
They are locked into Catholic doctrine, leading to high fertility rates. In this narrative, 
Latinos, especially Mexican immigrants and their children, are seldom represented as 
agents of positive change, because their unwillingness to integrate denies them the 
opportunity to influence the larger society in any appreciable way, except in the negative- 
as a threat to existing social institutions (Chavez, 2013:45). 
Therefore, assumptions and stereotypes about the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, 
particularly Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants with darker skin tones, may be more likely to settle in 
communities with higher levels of economic disadvantage and social disorganization, further 
from predominantly white communities, and in areas with consistently higher levels of crime. 
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Hypothesis (4):  In communities disaggregated by predominant ethnoracial type, where there is a 
change in the immigrant population by ethnicity (2000-2009) there will be inverse effects on 
community violent crime (2012). 
Although research has consistently shown that immigrants are not more crime prone than 
individuals in the native population, the contexts of the community to which the immigrants from 
specific nations move may structure their ability to avoid crime and criminal participation. 
Building on previous community-level immigration and crime research, this dissertation 
contributes to our understanding of immigration and crime predictions by: 1) using dynamic 
community-level models to better capture the changing nature of communities noted in the urban 
sociological and social disorganization frameworks: 2) following early social disorganization 
theory’s prediction that ethnic heterogeneity contributes to increases in crime by disaggregating 
the foreign-born population by Hispanic/Latin@ and non-Hispanic/Latin@ ethnicity; 3) 
disaggregating the diverse Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population by nation of origin to better 
examine if the diversity within the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population differentially affects 
violent crime in communities; and 4) considering how race, ethnicity, and the context of 
community characteristics differentially condition criminogenic factors. Using 2000 and 2012 
data on census tracts in Chicago for which there are available crime data in the National 
Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS I) and forthcoming NNCS II in combination with data from 
the 2000 Decennial Census SF3 and the 2006-2009 ACS, the current work  examines how 
changes in the immigrant (measured as foreign-born from various Hispanic/Latin@ contributing 
nations or non-Hispanic/Latin@) populations in a community affect community violent crime.
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CHAPTER THREE: EXAMINING SECONDARY DATA SOURCES TO 
UNDERSTAND COMMUNITY STRUCTURE, POPULATION CHANGES 
AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN CRIME 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
To better understand the impact of disaggregating the foreign-born population by 
ethnicity on violent crime in Chicago, the current work uses several secondary data sources (U.S. 
Decennial Census Summary File 3, The 2005-2009 American Community Survey, and the 
National Neighborhood Crime Study I and II) with demographic, economic and crime data for 
Chicago census tracts. First, I explore the effects of changes in the immigrant population on 
community violent crime rates. Due to the large population size of census tracts across Chicago, 
(see table 3.1 for descriptive statistics), relative to the average violent crime rate, it is acceptable 
to analyze the change in crime rates rather than analyze a change in crime counts (Osgood, 2000). 
Analyses then move to examine how changes in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population and 
non-Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population affect violent crime in the community. Next, models 
examine how diversity within the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population (measured as 
immigration by nation of origin) may differentially affect changes in community violent crime. 
Finally, I assess the influence of changes in the immigrant population by Hispanic/Latin@ nation 
of origin on changes in community violent crime for neighborhoods with different predominant 
ethnoracial compositions. 
STUDY SITE: CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
Historically, Chicago has been home to a large population of the nation’s immigrants; in 
fact, by 1870 the city’s foreign-born population was one of the largest in the United States – 
nearly half of all residents (48%) in Chicago were foreign-born (Paral, 2003). As recently as 
2009, roughly 21% of all Chicago residents self-identified as foreign-born; at the census tract 
level, the foreign-born population comprised between 0 and 67% of the community’s population 
(see Table 3.1 for select census tract population descriptive statistics). Like the foreign-born 
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population in destination cities across the United States, Chicago’s early immigrant population 
generally migrated from Europe. Immigrants, particularly Mexican and Latino immigrants, 
relocated to Chicago after World War II for agricultural, industrial and railroad jobs (Fernandez, 
2017). By the mid to late 20th century, the city experienced a shift in foreign-born migration after 
the 1965 Immigration Act and throughout that period immigrants were largely from Latino and 
Asian nations with the largest increases in the immigrant population migrating from Mexico 
(Paral, 2003). Census tracts across Chicago in 2009 vary in their immigrant resident population; 
Figure 3.1 presents maps of foreign-born census tract compositions (n=814). Chicago’s long 
history with a racially and ethnically diverse population, currently comprised of census tracts with 
up to 59% Hispanic foreign-born residents and up to 65.1% non-Hispanic foreign-born residents 
(2009) allows for an examination of how changes in the community immigrant population, 
contextualized by the intersections of race, ethnicity, and social class operate to influence changes 
in community violent crime. Moreover, as a city that has, historically, been the center of 
community-level crime research in sociology/criminology and as the city where social 
disorganization theory was first conceptualized thus informing social scientists on the causes of 
crime at a meso-level, the current work conducts an investigation of immigration, ethnicity, and 
crime in communities across Chicago. 
Early 21st century research has noted that, like findings in the mid-20th century, increased 
immigration does not have the deleterious effects on communities as suggested by public and 
political discourses (Browning, 2002; Desmond and Kubrin, 2009; Lauritsen 2001; Lee et al., 
2001, Martinez, 2002; Martinez and Lee, 2000; Martinez, Lee and Nielsen, 2004). Using data on 
Chicago census tracts, the current work contributes to sociological and criminological scholarship 
by considering how the following community characteristics influence changes in violent crime: 
1) change in the foreign-born population, 2)  change in communities’ foreign-born population by 
ethnicity, 3) change in communities’ foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ population by nation of 
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origin within the Hispanic/Latin@ ethnicity, and 3) the community context of neighborhood 
ethnoracial structure where there have been changes in the foreign-born population. 
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FIGURE 3.1: FOREIGN-BORN CENSUS TRACT COMPOSITION 2009 
 
 
DATA 
 
THE UNITED STATES DECENNIAL CENSUS AND AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY  
Every ten years, as a department within the United States Department of Commerce and 
under the supervision of the Economics and Statistics Administration, the United States Census 
Bureau (Census) counts every U.S. resident as well as collects various housing, person, and 
economic information from residents (U.S. Decennial Census of Population and Housing). 
Mandated by the U.S. Constitution, the fundamental purpose of the Decennial Census is to 
determine the allocation of government representatives to act and speak on behalf of U.S. 
residents; however, the U.S. Census Bureau regularly collects, analyzes and disseminates 
aggregate information about the U.S. population. The current work uses data from the 2000 
Decennial Census Summary File Three (SF 3) to measure demographic, economic, social, and 
housing characteristics on census tracts for which there are also National Neighborhood Crime 
Data (NNCSI and II), across the city of Chicago, Illinois (n=814). Using a nationally 
representative, random sample of the population, the 2000 Census SF 3 contains rich, detailed 
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demographic and economic data at the census tract, city, county, and state levels.  Further, SF 3 
data also contain detailed information on a random, representative, housing (i.e., physical 
structures, tenure etc.)  sample (for a thorough discussion of the 2000 Census SF3, see Summary 
File 3: Technical Documentation, 2007). 
In response to the federal need for consistent, comparable information on the U.S. 
population and communities, the American Community Survey (ACS) was funded and began 
data collection in 2005. As part of the U.S. Census Bureau, the ACS is a random, nationally 
representative, rolling survey of U.S. and Puerto Rican population samples that provide 
information on the U.S. population, housing, and group quarters between (one, three and five 
years) the decennial Census years (ACS, 2014). Like the Decennial Census SF 3 data, the ACS 
contains population demographic, housing, and economic data reported in aggregate at the place, 
census tract, county, city, and state levels. Moreover, rather than continue to have the Decennial 
Census collect SF 3 (long form) data every ten years, the ACS data collects very similar data on a 
sample of the U.S. population and is now the primary source for detailed census tract level 
population and housing information. As such, ACS data are regularly used in social science, 
medical, policy, and government research/publications (for a thorough discussion of history and 
methodology see ACS Design and Methodology, 2014). This dissertation uses ACS 2005-2009 
survey data on Chicago census tracts for 2009 measures of community demographic and 
economic census tract characteristics. The 2000 SF 3 and 2005-2009 ACS are ideal secondary 
sources for the current project due to the rigorous, representative and consistent methodology of 
the U.S. Census Bureau, the comparability and availability of census tract-level data on the 
native-born, and foreign-born population groups disaggregated by race as well as foreign-born 
nation of origin. 
THE NATIONAL NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME STUDY I AND II 
The key outcome variable change in the violent crime rate (2012), for census tracts in 
Chicago, Illinois comes from unique, nationally representative datasets. The National 
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Neighborhood Crime Study I and II (NNCSI and NNCSII, respectively) are data files that contain 
data from the 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census combined with tract-level crime data for 9,593 
census tracts in 91, randomly chosen large U.S. cities that are representative of all large cities in 
the United States. Created by Ruth D. Peterson and Lauren J. Krivo, the NNCSI and NNCSII 
(forthcoming) are housed and distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and 
Social Research within the ICPSR Resource Center for Minority Data (RCMD). The original 
purpose of these data was to explore community-level sources of variation in FBI index crime 
rates. Crime data in each census tract were gathered by the principal investigators who contacted 
individual police departments in each city and requested address-based crime incident data or 
tract-level counts of index crimes. Police departments in 26 of the selected cities provided crime 
data for the census tract. The remaining 65 city jurisdictions provided address-based crime 
incident reports. Peterson and Krivo (2001) geocoded the incident data and assigned these to the 
appropriate census tracts before aggregation for final census tract crime rates. Data quality checks 
were performed on the crime data by comparing the jurisdiction-reported crimes to the total 
agency count for the same crimes reported in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report. Crimes reported 
in tracts were included in the NNCS if the quality check was within 10 percentage points of each 
other; otherwise, tract crimes were coded as missing. Tracts with fewer than 300 residents 
(n=623), or tracts with more than 50% institutionalized residents (n=164), were excluded from 
the NNCS (Krivo et. al., 2009). The current dissertation uses information on 814 Chicago census 
tracts included in the 2000 Decennial Summary File 3, the American Community Survey (2005-
2009), and the NNCS I & II. A complete list of variables from all datasets, and 
operationalizations, are presented in Appendix A. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CHANGE IN VIOLENT CRIME RATE 
The dependent variable, change in the violent crime rate (2012-2000), is the difference 
between the 2012 violent crime rate per 1,000 residents in the census tract and the 2000 violent 
crime rate per 1,000 residents in the same census tract (tracts are normalized to 2000 tract 
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boundaries). The violent crime rate for each year included in this dissertation are three-year 
averages of the homicide and robbery events known to police (i.e., 1999-2001 and 2011-2013) 
divided by the total tract populations (2000 and 2009), then multiplied by 1,000.  
The choice to use only robbery and homicide in the violent crime measure(s) is guided by 
empirical examinations comparing self-report and official reports of crime incidents in 
communities with large immigrant population concentrations. For example, Hillenbrand and 
Davis (1993) found that in communities with large immigrant populations, there were substantive 
differences in residents’ willingness to report less serious crimes to police. Further, Davis and 
Henderson (2003) found that in communities with low levels of collective efficacy, large 
ethnoracial minority and immigrant populations, residents were hesitant to report less serious 
crimes. Moreover, Latin@ immigrant residents’ perceptions regarding the relationship between 
police contact and fear of deportation as well as excessive use of force influence an 
underreporting of assault and property crime (Messing, Becerra, Ward-Lasher and Androff; 
2015). 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The independent variables used in the current project come from the 2000 Decennial 
Census, reported at the census tract level for tracts in the city of Chicago. The current work 
follows Kubrin and colleagues’ (2016) and others’ (DiPietro and Bursik, 2012; Ferraro, 2016) 
suggestions for measurement of the foreign-born population in a community to include ethnic 
designations across different nations of origin, with various cultural characteristics and 
motivations for migration. That is, this dissertation uses measures of ethnicity (Hispanic or non-
Hispanic) and nation of origin (from Hispanic/Latin@ nations) in conjunction with a measure of 
foreign-born status to capture the percent (and percent change 2000-2009) of Hispanic/Latin@ 
immigrants versus non-Hispanic foreign-born residents in a community. Currently, the only 
ethnic designation recognized by the decennial census is Hispanic/Latino. As recently as the 2000 
Census, U.S. residents who self-identified as Hispanic/Latino alone or in any race combination 
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were then asked to identify their nation of origin. For this reason, in the current work, the percent 
of residents from Census-defined Hispanic/Latino nations represent the percent of the tract 
population who are both Hispanic/Latin@ and foreign-born. 
 The independent variable percent foreign-born is the number of residents in a census 
tract who self-report being born in a nation outside of the United States, divided by the total tract 
population and multiplied by one hundred. Percent Hispanic/Latino immigrant population5 is 
constructed using the following steps. The first step is to sum the number of residents in a census 
tract who report their origin as being from the Hispanic/Latino nations recognized as such in the 
decennial census (see also Kubrin et al., 2016). The number of foreign-born Hispanic/Latino 
residents is then divided by the total tract population and multiplied by one hundred. Change in 
percent foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@6is constructed by taking the difference between the 
percent foreign-born Hispanic/Latino population (2009-2000); the year 2000 percent foreign-born 
Hispanic/Latin@ variable comes from the 2000 Census SF 3 and is measured in the same way 
described above for the 2009 (ACS 2005-2009) foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ variable. Percent 
non-Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population is measured as the number of foreign-born 
Hispanic/Latino residents in a tract subtracted from the total foreign-born tract population; this 
                                                     
5 The U.S. Census defines Hispanic or Latino as “a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central 
American, or other Spanish culture regardless of race” (Census, 2017; see also Kubrin, Hipp and Kim, 2016). In the 
current work, foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ is measured as persons who report their nation of origin as one of the 
following: Cuba, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Other Central America, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Other South America 
or Spain. In several population tables, the ACS reports the percent of the foreign-born population who are 
Hispanic/Latino; to confirm the appropriateness of summing Hispanic/Latino nations of origin to obtain the percent of 
the foreign-born population (while maintaining the ability to disaggregate the foreign-born Hispanic-Latin@ population 
by nation of origin), a correlation analysis was performed between the measure used in the current work and the 
measure reported in the ACS (r=.96**). 
6 NNCS I crime data, 2000 SF 3, and 2005-2009 ACS data are, originally, reported in the Census 2000 census tract 
boundaries. Census tract boundaries may change between decennial census data collections (i.e., some tracts will be 
combined with others or some will be split into more than one -new or existing- tracts). In the city of Chicago, roughly 
30% of the census tracts in 2000 underwent some type of boundary change by the 2010 census. To analyze similarities 
and change in crime across Chicago census tracts between the two time points, the LTDB (Longitudinal Tract 
Database) reverse-interpolation procedure was used to interpolate the 2010 crime data to 2000 census tract boundaries 
(see Logan et al., 2014 for more details). While there are some concerns about the methods used in census data 
interpolation where census tracts have undergone boundary changes, the LDTB procedure combines areal and 
population interpolation (without including water covered areas) and “are clearly preferable to the NCDB 
[Neighborhood Change Database] for the 2000 to 2010 decade” (Logan et al., 2016:1026). 
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value is then divided by the total tract population and multiplied by one hundred.  The change in 
the non-Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born immigrant population is measured as the (2009-2000) 
difference in the percent of residents in a tract that self-identify as foreign-born and not from a 
Hispanic/Latino nation (2000 SF 3 and 2005-2009 respectively).7  Positive, higher, values in each 
change variable indicate an increase in the measure whereas negative values indicate a decrease 
in the measure. Finally, Percent Foreign-born Hispanic Mexico nativity measures only the 
percent of the foreign-born Hispanic residents in a tract who reported being born in Mexico; 
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic nativity other than Mexico measures the percent  of the foreign-
born Hispanic residents in a tract who reported being born in a Hispanic/Latino nation other than 
Mexico (see footnote 3 for a list of other Hispanic/Latino nations).All percentage measures are 
constructed out of the total tract population. 
NEIGHBORHOOD TYPES 
Following the work of Krivo, Peterson and Kuhl (2009), and Martinez and colleagues 
(2016), this dissertation explores the context of changes in foreign-born populations by 
examining community characteristics in communities that are predominantly white, Black, 
Hispanic/Latin@, and integrated according to aggregate percentages of community residents’ 
self-reported race and ethnicity in the 2005-2009 American Community Survey. The 
communities are defined as a predominant ethnoracial community if the population of the 
respective racial or ethnic group constituted 70% or more of the total tract population8. Minority 
communities are defined as tracts where each of the self-reported Black and self-reported 
                                                     
7 While some of the political and public immigration-crime rhetoric involves discussions of differences between the 
documented and undocumented statuses of immigrants, the tract-level census data used in the current work does not 
allow for such an examination. However, recent work by Light and Miller (2018) concluded that, at the state-level, the 
relationship between changes in the states’ undocumented and documented population alike was most often negative 
and, in some instances, statistically significant. 
8 Minority tracts are defined as such when the population of the tract consists of a combined Hispanic/Latin@ and 
Black population that is at least 70% and has a white population of less than 30% and where none of the racial or ethnic 
groups alone constitute more than 70%. There were 37 tracts identified as predominantly minority, as well as 3 tracts 
classified as predominantly Asian; due to the small number of minority and Asian communities, a total of 40 tracts 
were excluded from the neighborhood type analyses. 
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Hispanic resident population proportions are no less than 35% and neither population alone 
equals more than 70%. All other tracts are designated “integrated” communities.   
Figure 3.2: Neighborhoods by Predominant Ethnoracial Type 2009 
 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
To examine and better understand how community characteristics and changes in 
immigrant population affect violent crime, the following variables - based on previous research 
on crime in communities – serve as control variables (see Appendix A for list of all variables and 
operationalizations). First, the age and family structure compositions of a census tract population 
may contribute to or protect against crime: therefore, the current analyses include measures for 
the percent young male population (the number of residents in a tract who are male aged 15-24, 
divided by the total tract population, then multiplied by 100) and the percent married with 
children (the number of residents in a tract who report being married with children under age 
eighteen, divided by the total tract population, then multiplied by 100). Second, the level of 
disadvantage in a community has consistently predicted the amount of crime in a community and 
  
40 
 
is measured in the current work as a disadvantage index. Based on the results of a factor analysis, 
the disadvantage index is comprised of six variables: 1) percent female-headed households; 2) 
percent unemployed; 3) percent high school graduates; 4) percent poverty; 5) the percent of 
residents who are employed in low-wage occupations9; and 6) the percent of professional, high-
wage, workers who self-report employment in professional, scientific and technical services as 
well as in the management of companies and enterprises.  Third, Residential instability is 
measured based on the results of a factor analysis and is comprised of the percent of the 
population renting their residence and the percent who moved into their residence within the past 
year. 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION  
The current work includes census and crime data across 814 Chicago census tracts (774 
census tracts are used in analyses that include predominant ethnoracial neighborhood types). 
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 3.1 suggest that community characteristics such as level 
of disadvantage, racial heterogeneity, and residential stability remained fairly stable from 2000-
2009. Overall, change in the tract population ranged from a loss of over 4,500 residents to a gain 
of roughly 6,600 residents. The median change in tract population was an increase of 180 
residents. The change in tract levels of key variables (i.e., the change in the young male 
population, change in tract disadvantage, change in racial heterogeneity, and change in the 
foreign-born population) are normally distributed with a mean at or close to zero; the maps in 
Figure 3.2 depict the variation in population and key community characteristic changes across the 
sample. It appears that in communities where disadvantage increased, residential instability 
increased as well. Further, in many tracts where racial heterogeneity increased, disadvantage 
decreased.
                                                     
9 Following the work of Krivo and Peterson (2001) in the NNCSI, low-wage occupations is measured by the percent of 
working residents in a tract who self-report employment in six occupations with the lowest average incomes 
(accommodation and food services, health and social support services, transportation and warehousing, agriculture, 
forestry, fishing and hunting, building maintenance/cleaning and other services such as personal care). 
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Table 3.1 Chicago Census Tract Descriptive Statistics and Change 2009 - 2000 (n=814) 
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Figure 3.3: Changes in Tract Population and Select Tract Characteristics (2009 – 2000)* 
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On average, across the 814 Chicago census tracts used in the current work, violent crime rates 
declined (much like the decline seen across the United States during the same time-period) and consistent 
with community-crime research, there are some communities with larger declines in violent crime than 
others (Baumer, Vélez and Rosenfeld, 2018). Between 2000 and 2012, Figure 3.4 suggests that there was 
an increase in the violent crime rate where there was a greater increase in the communities’ foreign-born 
population (see Figure 3.1); however, there is a slight difference in the change in violent crime in 
communities where there was a greater increase in the percent non-Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born 
population compared to communities where there was a greater increase in the percent Hispanic/Latin@ 
foreign-born population. Further, a brief look at the figures of foreign-born population distributions, 
change in violent crime, and communities by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood types (Figures 3.1, 
3.2 and 3.4 respectively) preliminarily suggest that there are some differences in the predominant 
ethnoracial neighborhood types where the foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ and non-Hispanic/Latin@ settle; 
moreover, it also appears that change in violent crime varies by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood 
type.  The maps in Figures 3.1 and 3.4 offer initial support for investigating how changes in the foreign-
born population, and changes in the foreign-born population disaggregated by ethnicity, affect changes in 
violent crime. In addition, the maps in Figure 3.2 and 3.4 offer initial support for examining the changes 
in violent crime rates, community characteristics and ethnoracial neighborhood contexts where the 
foreign-born populations were changing.  
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Figure 3.4: Changes in Chicago Tract Violent Crime per 1,000 residents (2012-2000)* 
 
 
*Darker color represents a greater decrease in violent crime; to visualize changes in violent crime, color variants are binned into 
25 color groups. 
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ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
Recognizing that communities are dynamic places where change is expected, the current 
work uses census-tract level data across 814 Chicago census tracts with select change scores to 
systematically test the four hypotheses presented in Chapter Two (see Appendix Table 1 series 
for a list of hypotheses and proposed analytical models). The first two hypotheses are tested using 
six ordinary least squares regression models with, all things equal, the percent foreign-born 
(2000), the change in the percent foreign-born (2009-2000), the percent foreign-born Hispanic 
(2000), the change in the percent foreign-born Hispanic (2009-2000), the percent foreign-born 
non-Hispanic (2000), and the change in the percent foreign-born non-Hispanic populations as 
independent variables to predict change in community violent crime rates (2012-2000). 
Hypothesis 3 is tested using ordinary least squares regression models with the percent of a tract 
population that is foreign-born Hispanic from Mexico, and foreign-born Hispanic born in 
Hispanic/Latino nations other than Mexico, 10 as well as change in both populations (2009-
2000)11.  
Ordinary Least Squares regression analyses are appropriate for testing hypotheses with a 
continuous dependent variable, and when the assumptions of this statistical method are met (i.e., 
random sampling, independence of residuals, linear relationship between independent and 
dependent variables, homoscedastic error terms, absence of autocorrelation in the model(s), 
normal distribution of errors, and absence of multicollinearity) (Gujarati, 2018).  Visual 
inspection of scatterplots revealed slight, linear relationships between the independent and 
                                                     
10 Due to the small numbers of Hispanic foreign-born residents from nations other than Mexico, the analyses focus only 
on foreign-born Hispanic residents from Mexico and Hispanic foreign-born residents born in Hispanic nations other 
than Mexico. 
11 To minimize the number of models presented in this proposal, model 7 is described and presented in Appendix Table 
1.1 as one large model with all nations of origin and change in each nation of origin in one model; however, when the 
analyses are conducted, prior to running the model 7 that is presented, an intercept-only model will be compared with 
models in which each nation of origin and change score are added in step-wise fashion. 
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dependent variables; in addition, a histogram of the dependent variable (change in violent crime) 
reveals a generally normal distribution with a mean of zero. After examining census tract outliers, 
and comparing post-estimation plots of the model residuals, the six outliers do not 
disproportionately influence the regression results; further, the residuals are normally distributed.  
However, due to heteroscedasticity confirmed by a visual inspection of residual versus predicted 
values, the OLS hypotheses tests in this dissertation use robust standard errors. 
Equation 1: Ordinary Least Squares Regression with Robust Standard Errors 
∆𝑌𝑖 =  𝐵1𝑋1𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑋2𝑖 + 𝐵3𝑋3𝑖 + 𝐵𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖 … 𝑢𝑖 
Where ΔY denotes the change in the tract violent crime rate (violent crime rate at time one (2000) 
subtracted from the violent crime rate at time two (2011)), 𝐵1 is the intercept, 𝐵2 … 𝐵𝑘 are the 
regression coefficients, 𝑋1 … 𝑋𝑘 are the independent or control variables and include a control of 
violent crime at time one (2000), 𝑖 is the observation at time one (2000), and 𝑢 denotes the error 
term. The addition of the control variable for violent crime at time one (2000) ensures that the 
starting-point/lower limit of violent crime per 1000 residents (floor effect) in these analyses is 
accounted for across each model (see Allison, 1990). 
 As found throughout community and neighborhood studies for over a century, 
communities that are geographically near one another are more similar in their characteristics and 
structure than are communities that are geographically further apart. Therefore, in neighborhood-
level research it is necessary, albeit not always sufficient, to acknowledge the spatial proximity 
and effects of changes in one are on changes in nearby areas. Despite the diagnostic finding, 
using post-estimation plot comparisons, that residuals in the full-model using pan-ethnic foreign-
born measures are independent, Figures 3.1 through 3.4 all present clusters of census tracts with 
similar characteristics (i.e., predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type, change in independent 
and dependent variables). Further, the Moran’s I statistic measures the linear correlation between 
variable values and the weighted average (measured by distance between tracts) of nearby tracts 
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(Moran, 1950). The Moran’s I statistic for the OLS residuals of the full regression model using 
pan-ethnic percent foreign-born measures is -0.02 with a p-value in favor of the null hypothesis- 
that there is no spatial dependence. While it could be that changes occurring in the foreign-born 
populations in one Chicago community may affect changes in a neighboring community, as an 
initial examination of the dynamic nature of immigration, ethnicity and violent crime, and despite 
the non-significant, substantially small Moran’s I statistic, this dissertation includes models that 
recognize spatial dependence through error terms (spatial error models).  
Equation 2: Spatial Error Model  
∆𝑌𝑖 =  𝐵1𝑋1𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑋2𝑖 + 𝐵3𝑋3𝑖 + 𝐵𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖 … + (𝐼 − 𝜆𝑊) − 1 𝑢𝑖 
Where ΔY denotes the change in the tract violent crime rate (violent crime rate at time one (2000) 
subtracted from the violent crime rate at time two (2011)), 𝐵1 is the intercept, 𝐵2 … 𝐵𝑘 are the 
regression coefficients, 𝑋1 … 𝑋𝑘 are the independent or control variables and include a control of 
violent crime at time one (2000), 𝑖 is the observation at time one (2000), (𝐼 − 𝜆𝑊) is the inverse 
covariance weight matrix, and 𝑢 denotes the error term.  Using this model, spatial dependence 
between observations is treated as a nuisance thus improving the OLS estimates, standard errors, 
significance and model fit (Anselin, 2017).
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CHAPTER FOUR: DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES, DIFFERENTIAL CRIME 
RATES 
 
 Chapter Four follows the methods previously outlined to examine the descriptive as well 
as predictive relationships between population and structural community characteristics of 
Chicago communities (n=814) and crime. The chapter begins with thorough descriptive and 
bivariate analyses to examine the strength and direction of associations between the study’s 
variables. Analyses then move to test the effects of foreign-born population concentrations and, 
changes in foreign-born populations on changes in community violent crime rates. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE AND BIVARIATE ANALYSES OF SAMPLE VARIABLES 
 
VIOLENT CRIME, COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS, AND CHANGE 
Before turning to the multiple regression model analyses of the change in crime, the 
current work examines variation across Chicago communities, and relationships between the 
community level study variables. The results of the Spearman’s rank-order correlations between 
all variables used in the analyses are presented in Table 4.1. During the crime decline (from 
roughly 1991 through 2012), communities across the United States were experiencing declines in 
violent and property crime; however, some communities experienced greater declines in crime 
than others (2000-2012 across 842 Chicago communities: mean= -6.7, minimum= -66.7, 
maximum= 39.9). In Chicago communities, a higher crime rate in the year 2000 is related to a 
statistically significant, greater decline in crime between 2000 and 2012 (ρ= -0.85***). The 
percent of a community that is married with children (2000) is associated with lower levels of 
violent crime in 2000 and 2012 (ρ= -0.5*** both years) but has an inverse relationship to the 
change in the violent crime rate. Level of disadvantage is positively related to violent crime in 
2000 and 2012 (ρ= 0.5** for both); however, disadvantage is negatively associated with the 
change in violent crime (ρ= -0.25***)- and this result, while strange to those familiar with the 
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large body of work driven by social disorganization, is best interpreted as an artifact of the crime 
decline that was already in motion across the United States in combination with the decrease in 
disadvantage across Chicago’s safest communities (Papachristos, Brazil and Chang, 2018)12.  
                                                     
12 Steps were taken to verify that the coding and interpretation of the disadvantage index were correct. First, 
the disadvantage index variable was examined by placing the values of the disadvantage index into 
categories; low disadvantage was defined as the minimum value (-2.3) through one standard deviation 
above the mean (1.0); moderate disadvantage was defined as the range between 1.1 and two standard 
deviations above the mean (2.0); high disadvantage was defined as the range between 2.01 and the 
maximum value 3.63. The disadvantage index categorical variable was then examined in a crosstabulation 
with the neighborhood type categorical value. Consistent with previous research, using these very broad 
ranges of disadvantage yielded the following: only Black neighborhoods in the (2000) sample represented 
all three categories of disadvantage (192 had low levels, 91 had moderate levels, and 26 were categorized 
as high disadvantage). Further examination of the disadvantage index variable was then conducted by 
examining each of the index variable statistics by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type. On average, 
across the 26 predominantly Black neighborhoods defined as high disadvantage: 22% of the population 
were employed in secondary, low-wage occupations; 10% were employed as professional workers, 18% of 
the population were unemployed; 29% had only a high school education, 16% of the households were 
female headed with children, and 66% of the population were living below the poverty line. By 
comparison, the other three neighborhood types were all defined as having low levels of disadvantage. 
After this verification of coding and interpretation was conducted, it is reasonable to note that higher 
numbers of the disadvantage index score represent communities with high disadvantage. 
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Table 4.1 Correlations between Control Variables (2000), Community Change (2009-2000) & Change in Violent Crime (2012-2000) 
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FOREIGN-BORN POPULATIONS, CRIME, CHANGE AND COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS 
Consistent with prior research results, where there was a higher concentration of foreign-
born residents (overall) in a community, there was a moderate, statistically significant decline in 
the violent crime rate in the years 2000 and 2012 (ρ= -0.4***). Although larger population 
concentrations of the foreign-born population are slightly related to statistically significant higher 
changes in crime rates (2012-2000) (ρ= 0.2***), there is no relationship between the change in 
the foreign-born population overall and the change in community crime rates (2012-2000). This 
finding is not surprising because communities with a higher concentration of foreign-born 
residents in 2000 had a statistically significant relationship (ρ= -0.3***) to a decrease (or smaller 
increase) in the foreign-born population (2009-2000). Therefore, a larger foreign-born population 
in 2000 represented a relatively stable proportion of the foreign-born population (2009-2000). 
Moreover, the foreign-born population concentration (2000) had a significant, positive 
relationship (ρ= 0.2***) with the change in violent crime (2012-2000).  
As reported in other research on immigration across the United States, the concentration 
of the foreign-born population at time one (2000) was strongly associated with a larger proportion 
of Hispanic foreign-born residents (ρ= 0.8***). This offers support for findings that note the 
foreign-born population in the United States after the 1965 Immigration Act largely self-reports 
Hispanic/Latino nations of origin (Lopez and Bialik, 2017). Further, it also offers support for the 
methodological choice in some research to allow the percent foreign-born to act as a measure of 
the percent foreign-born Hispanic population (Martinez, 2002).  
The foreign-born population was, on average (mean and median = -0.6), declining across 
Chicago communities between 2000 and 2009, thus it is interesting to note that there is a 
statistically significant, negative relationship (ρ= -0.2***) between the concentration of foreign-
born residents and the change in the percent of the community that was foreign-born Hispanic. It 
could be that communities with a higher concentration of foreign-born residents in 2000 were 
experiencing out-migration (Hispanic foreign-born residents moving out of Chicago 
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communities), or less in-migration of the Hispanic foreign-born population (fewer foreign-born 
Hispanic residents moving into Chicago communities). This correlation provides support for 
research that suggests new immigrants are not necessarily moving into or remaining in 
traditionally immigrant communities (Stowell, 2007). Similarly, larger foreign-born community 
population concentrations are moderately associated with the percent of the community 
population that is non-Hispanic foreign-born (ρ= 0.6***) and the foreign-born concentration of a 
community in 2000 had a weak, negative relationship with change in the non-Hispanic foreign-
born population (ρ= -0.2***).  
A larger concentration of foreign-born residents is, not surprisingly, strong and positively 
related to the percent of the foreign-born population that is from Mexico (ρ= 0.8***), and it is 
positively related to a larger change in the percent foreign-born from Mexico (ρ= 0.3***). Thus, 
it could be suggested that, at first glance, newer Mexican immigrants sought communities with 
large foreign-born populations and perhaps saw more opportunities for establishing human and 
economic capital by settling in areas where other Mexican immigrants were established. The 
same is true for foreign-born Hispanic residents who migrated from nations other than Mexico 
(ρ= 0.5***), and the change in the foreign-born Hispanic population from nations other than 
Mexico (ρ= 0.2***). Finally, the larger the concentration of the foreign-born population in the 
community at time one (2000) was associated with a higher percentage of young men in the 
population (ρ= 0.3***), a higher percentage of married families with children (ρ= 0.7***), lower 
levels of disadvantage (ρ= -0.3***) and no relationship to community residential instability. 
Moreover, more foreign-born population concentrations were in neighborhood types that were 
predominantly non-white (ρ=0.5***). 
FOREIGN-BORN POPULATIONS BY ETHNICITY, CRIME & COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS 
Relationships between the community-level measures of the changes in foreign-born 
populations in Chicago communities by ethnicity and nation of origin reveal slightly different 
associations to changes in violent crime. In 2000, across Chicago communities, the concentration 
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of foreign-born Hispanic residents in communities (2000) had moderately-weak, negative 
relationships to the 2000 and 2012 crime rates (ρ= -0.3***). This supports previous findings that 
areas with more foreign-born Hispanic residents had lower levels of violent crime (Martinez, 
2002; Stowell and Martinez, 2009; Vélez, 2009). However, change in the foreign-born Hispanic 
population (2009-2000) was positively, yet very weakly, associated with a higher violent crime 
rate in 2012 (ρ= 0.1*). Moreover, higher proportions of a community population that is foreign-
born Hispanic is positively associated with the percent of young males in the population            
(ρ= 0.4***), a higher percent of married families with children (ρ= 0.6***), and had no 
relationship to disadvantage or residential instability.  
Population concentration of non-Hispanic foreign-born residents (2000) was negatively 
related to both the 2000 and 2012 violent crime rates (ρ= -0.3** both years) suggesting that areas 
with non-Hispanic foreign-born residents were also in areas with lower levels of violent crime.  
A higher percent of a community population that was foreign-born non-Hispanic was associated 
with a lower proportion of young males in the community (ρ= -0.1**); a higher percent of the 
community who were married with children (ρ= 0.3***), and lower levels of disadvantage  
(ρ= -0.4***). Larger proportions of young males in the community and more residential stability 
at time one (2000) was associated with decreases, or smaller increases, in the foreign-born non-
Hispanic population (2009-2000) (ρ= -0.1** for both).  
FOREIGN-BORN HISPANIC BY NATION OF ORIGIN, CRIME & COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS 
Concentrations of foreign-born Hispanic by nativity had differential effects on crime in 
2000 and 2009. Foreign-born residents from Mexico had an inverse relationship with violent 
crime, (ρ= -0.2*** and ρ= -.3*** in 2000 & 2009 respectively) and there was no relationship 
between Hispanic foreign-born residents from other Hispanic/Latino nations of origin. The 
relationships between the changes in foreign-born populations by Hispanic/Latino nation of 
origin and crime are slightly different; increases, or smaller decreases, in the percent foreign-born 
from Mexico had a weak, positive relationship to change in the violent crime rate (ρ= 0.1**) 
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whereas there was almost no relationship between changes in the percent foreign-born Hispanic 
population from nations other than Mexico and change in violent crime rates (ρ= 0.07*).   
The proportion of young men in a community is positively associated with the change in 
the percent of the population from both Mexico and foreign-born from Hispanic/Latino nations 
other than Mexico (ρ= 0.1** and ρ= 0.1*** respectively).  Similarly, the proportion of residents 
married with children was positively associated with the percent of the population from Mexico 
and the percent of the foreign-born Hispanic population from nations other than Mexico (ρ= 
0.4*** and ρ= 0.2*** respectively). Disadvantage at time one was negatively related to the 
change in the percent foreign-born from Mexico as well as the percent Hispanic foreign-born 
from nations other than Mexico (ρ= -0.2*** and ρ= -0.1** respectively). Finally, only the percent 
of the foreign-born from Hispanic/Latino nations other than Mexico was correlated with 
residential instability (ρ= -0.1**).  
At time one (2000), higher percentages of young men in the population and married 
families with children were positively related to change in the percent of the population who were 
foreign-born from Mexico (ρ= 0.4*** ρ= 0.6*** respectively). The level of disadvantage in 2000 
was negatively associated with the change in the percent of the population foreign-born from 
Mexico (ρ= -0.2***). Bivariate associations between study variables are important for examining 
the possibility of multicollinearity in subsequent regression models, as well as for acquiring a 
base-line understanding of the strength of linear relationships in between variables; however, they 
cannot provide a very clear picture of what is going on in communities because these 
relationships are not open to accounting for other contextual influences on either or both 
measures. 
SUMMARY OF THE DESCRIPTIVE AND CORRELATION ANALYSES 
At first glance it is evident, and not surprising, that there is variation across Chicago 
communities in population demographic and structural characteristics. Moreover, it appears that 
many of the community characteristics included in this dissertation remained fairly stable 
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between 2000 and 2009; yet, the usual communities and crime social disorganization, structural, 
measures continue to predict crime as expected. Consistent with immigration and crime research, 
there is less support for social disorganization theory’s immigrant population and crime 
predictions. That is, the correlational analyses of relationships between changes in the foreign-
born populations and changes in community crime offer only weak, and partial support for 
predictions based on social disorganization theory. The weak, yet statistically significant, 
relationships between foreign-born populations by ethnicity and many of the community 
characteristic measures suggest that differences in the foreign-born population by ethnicity may 
only predict indirect effects of foreign-born Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations on crime. 
Limiting an analysis to the relationship between the overall foreign-born population 
concentrations in a community and change in crime offers descriptive support for previous 
immigration and crime works. Yet, ending the analyses with this finding ignores many other 
pieces in the immigration, communities and crime story.  
Moreover, the correlational analyses reveal that parsing-out the foreign-born population 
by ethnicity hints at a more complex relationship between immigration and crime, as noted in 
Kubrin et. al., (2016). Similarly, the correlation analyses suggest that there is something 
happening in communities where there were changes in the Hispanic foreign-born population by 
nation of origin because these changes are related (differentially) to changes in community crime. 
Next, this dissertation will use multiple regression analyses to examine the nuances of changes in 
communities, neighborhood foreign-born populations, and changes in crime. 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSES  
EXAMINING FOREIGN-BORN POPULATIONS ON VIOLENT CRIME 
Prior to presenting the analyses that test this dissertation’s hypotheses, it is necessary to 
note that each multiple regression model (see table 4 series) accounts for the proper temporal 
order of the measures. Endogeneity and simultaneity are noted issues throughout community and 
crime literature. There is always the possibility that, rather than community characteristic 
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variables such as residential instability contributing to crime, it is crime that contributes to 
community structural characteristics, such as residential instability, in the community. For 
example, it is plausible to think that population turnover is the result of increasing crime in the 
community rather than increases in crime that result from population churn.  
Ensuring that there is proper temporal order of study variables is one small way to 
confront endogeneity and simultaneity; for example, it is highly unlikely that the crime rate in 
2012 influenced the proportion of the communities’ immigrant population to increase (or 
decrease) between 2000 and 2009. However, it is not unreasonable to think that there could have 
simultaneously been changes in crime between 2000 and 2012 and changes in community 
structure and population characteristics (2009-2000) that were driven by an omitted (exogenous) 
variable. To address the issue of omitted variable bias, the multiple regression models include the 
most frequently used, theoretically relevant community structure variables known to predict 
violent crime (cited throughout previous chapters), as well as control for the percent of the 
population who were foreign-born (2000) in models that include change in the foreign-born 
populations. The percent foreign-born population in 2000 recognizes that one predictor of 
subsequent increases in the foreign-born population are existing social ties with immigrant family 
and friends already living in the community (MacDonald, Hipp, and Gill, 2013; Vélez, 2009).  
CHANGE IN THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION AND CHANGE IN VIOLENT CRIME 
Consistently in the immigration-crime literature, scholars conclude that communities with 
a proportionally large foreign-born population benefit from lower levels of crime and some also 
benefit from revitalization (Lee et. al, 2001; Martinez et. al, 2004; Morenoff and Astor, 2006; 
Vélez, 2009). Turning to a test of hypotheses one and two13, regression models one and two 
                                                     
13 Hypothesis (1): In Chicago communities where there are increases (2009-2000) in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant 
population, there will be decreases (2012-2000) in the communities’ violent crime rates.  
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(Table 4.2) provide a baseline examination of the concentration of the foreign-born population 
overall (2000) and change in the foreign-born population (2009-2000) on change in violent crime 
rates (2012-2000). Results of the first two regression models are consistent with previous 
immigration, communities and crime research (see National Academies Press, 2010 and Ousey 
and Kubrin, 2017). First, communities with higher violent crime rates in 2000 predict a 
statistically significant, larger, decrease in the violent crime rate. When measuring the overall 
foreign-born population concentration in communities, areas with a higher percent of residents 
who are foreign-born predicts a significant decrease in violent crime. In 2000, communities with 
a greater foreign-born population concentration predicts a decrease in the violent crime rate     
(B= -0.12***) despite, as social disorganization theory predicts, having higher levels of 
disadvantage and more residential instability. Moreover, in communities where there were more 
residents living in a married-parent family structure there was a significant decrease in the violent 
crime rate. Model two presents similar results across the community structure control variables; 
higher levels of disadvantage and residential instability predict smaller decreases, or increases, in 
the violent crime rate. More married families in the community significantly predict decreases in 
the violent crime rate. Yet, when the concentration in a community’s percent foreign-born (2000) 
is considered alongside the change in the foreign-born population (2009-2000), the concentration 
of established foreign-born residents (2000) predicts the same decrease, or smaller increase in the 
violent crime rate (B= -0.13***), and the 2000-2009 changes in the foreign-born population have 
no effect on changes in the community violent crime rate. That an increase in the foreign-born 
population between 2000 and 2009 did not significantly influence change in violent crime (2012-
2000) is not surprising because, on average, the foreign-born population across Chicago 
communities decreased roughly 0.6%.  
                                                     
Hypothesis (2): In Chicago communities where there are increases (2009-2000) in the non-Hispanic/Latin@ 
immigrant population, there will be decreases (2012-2000) in the communities’ violent crime rates. 
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Therefore, to better understand if an increase in the foreign-born population affected 
changes in violent crime, the third and fourth models include only the communities (n=93) that 
experienced an increase (one standard deviation above the mean) in the foreign-born population 
(see descriptive statistics for this subgroup in Appendix Table 2). Focusing only on communities 
where there was an increase in the foreign-born population between 2000 and 2009, findings of 
model three show that, a concentration of foreign-born residents did not influence the change in 
violent crime. Results of model four tell a story that suggests, all things equal, increases in the 
foreign-born population (2009-2000) contributed to an increase in the change in violent crime  
(β= 0.37**). 
 The first two models presented in the current work offer support for previous 
immigration-crime findings— that increased immigrant concentration in a community predicts 
less violent crime (see National Academies Press, 2010 for a review); further, models three and 
four are consistent with Kubrin, Hipp, and Kim’s (2016) conclusion— the relationship between 
immigration and crime is complex. To examine if ethnicity contributes to this complex 
relationship, models five through eight examine changes in the foreign-born community 
populations’ effect on violent crime by, in step-wise fashion, including Hispanic and non-
Hispanic ethnicity of the foreign-born populations.  
 Across Chicago communities, all things equal, models five and six find that only 
community structure control variables predict change in violent crime (2012-2000). Larger 
concentrations of a Hispanic foreign-born population (2000) nor change in a community’s 
Hispanic foreign-born population (2009-2000) had a statistically significant effect on change in 
violent crime (2012-2000). Therefore, these first six models do not support hypothesis one.  
Yet, the results in models seven (B= -0.10**) and eight (B= -0.12***) suggest that a 
larger concentration of non-Hispanic foreign-born residents (2000) in communities predict larger 
decreases in the community violent crime rate between 2000 and 2012 than what was occurring 
elsewhere in Chicago during the era of the great crime decline. Like the results in the first two 
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models that examined the overall effect of foreign-born concentrations on change in violent 
crime, the results in model eight show that there was a significantly larger decrease in violent 
crime where, all things equal, there was a concentration of non-Hispanic foreign-born residents. 
That is, communities with a foreign-born non-Hispanic population composition of at least 17.6% 
(one standard deviation above the mean) there were roughly 38 fewer violent crimes per 1,000 
residents. The regression models used to test hypothesis two do not find support for the idea that 
changes in the foreign-born Hispanic population have an inverse effect on changes in violent 
crime; however, the differential results and strength of the effects of changes in the foreign-born 
population by ethnicity does suggest that in communities, immigration and crime research, 
examining the ethnicities of foreign-born populations are a worthwhile endeavor. 
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Table 4.2 OLS Regressions:  Foreign-born populations by Ethnicity & Change in Foreign-born Populations on Changes in Community Violent 
Crime Rates 
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Table 4.2 (continued) OLS Regressions:  Foreign-born populations by Hispanic Nativity & Change in Foreign-born Populations (2009-2000) on 
Changes in Community Violent Crime Rates (2012-2000) 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN VIOLENT 
CRIME 
Although I do not find support for the first two hypotheses, the results of the first eight 
regression models do reveal the importance of considering the role of ethnicity in immigration-
crime research. Statistically significant, greater declines in violent crime occurred across Chicago 
communities where there were concentrations of non-Hispanic foreign-born residents. This result 
did not occur in models that examine the Hispanic foreign-born population. Moreover, these 
findings were not evident in regression models that did not disaggregate the foreign-born 
population by ethnicity. To examine the possibility that a similar situation is occurring in models 
that include the overall Hispanic foreign-born population, analyses now turn to exploring the 
effect of diversity and changes within the Hispanic foreign-born population, on changes in violent 
crime.  
VARIATION IN THE FOREIGN-BORN HISPANIC POPULATION AND CHANGES IN VIOLENT CRIME 
Hypothesis three posits that there will be an inverse relationship between changes in the 
Hispanic immigrant population by nation of origin and changes in crime. Just as there is variation 
in the foreign-born population overall, there are different nations of origin represented in the 
Hispanic foreign-born population. The next four models, (Table 4.2) nine through twelve, present 
the regression results of Hispanic foreign-born population concentration, and changes in these 
populations, by Hispanic/Latino nations of origin (Mexico or other) on changes in violent crime. 
Again, like the previous series of regression models, structural community characteristics 
(disadvantage (range B= 3.0*** B= 4.0***) and residential instability (range B= 1.6*** 
B=1.8***)) predict changes in crime that support social disorganization theory. Further, the 
higher the crime rate in 2000, the more violent crime declined between 2000 and 2012 
(B= -0.6***). Communities with more residents in married family structures also predicted larger 
declines in the violent crime rate (B= -1.3***). Concentrations of foreign-born Hispanic residents 
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from Mexico, as well as changes in this immigrant population, did not influence change in 
community violent crime rates.  
However, model twelve reveals that changes in the foreign-born Hispanic population 
from Hispanic nations other than Mexico did predict a significant decrease in violent crime rates 
(B=-0.4**). All things equal, despite a concentration in the foreign-born Hispanic population 
from nations other than Mexico, change in the foreign-born Hispanic population from nations 
other than Mexico predict an increase in violent crime. The results of models nine through twelve 
provide partial support for hypothesis three; while change in a community’s foreign-born 
population from Mexico had no effect on crime, change in a community’s foreign-born 
population from Hispanic/Latino nations other than Mexico had a statistically significant, inverse 
relationship with the change in violent crime rates 2000-2012. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR DISAGGREGATED FOREIGN-BORN HISPANIC POPULATION EFFECTS 
ON CHANGES IN VIOLENT CRIME 
Examinations of community foreign-born Hispanic populations disaggregated by nation 
of origin provide support for the idea that there are differential effects of changes in Hispanic 
foreign-born populations on changes in violent crime- depending on where the Hispanic foreign-
born populations migrated from. Given the current political debates surrounding migration to the 
United States from Mexico and other Hispanic/Latino nations, it is worth noting that, consistent 
with previous research, there are either no effects of changes in Hispanic foreign-born 
populations on community violent crime, or changes in some Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born 
populations contribute to significant decreases in violent crime. The current work contributes to 
the academic literature by parsing-out how differences in our community immigrant populations 
affect changes in violent crime.  
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ANALYSES OF ETHNORACIAL COMMUNITY CONTEXT, CHANGES IN IMMIGRANT 
POPULATIONS & CHANGES IN VIOLENT CRIME 
DESCRIPTIVE & BIVARIATE RESULTS BY PREDOMINANT ETHNORACIAL NEIGHBORHOOD TYPES 
The fourth, and final, hypothesis in this dissertation suggests that due to the influence of 
the U.S. ethnoracial regime and related community ethnoracial segregation, immigrant 
populations in Chicago may be restricted in, or constrained by, their settlement community 
choice(s). Following this logic, increases in community immigrant populations may occur in 
communities with larger ethnoracial minority populations where, historically, there are higher 
levels of socially disorganizing structural characteristics relative to predominantly white 
neighborhoods (Krivo and Peterson, 2000; Ousey, 1999; Peterson and Krivo, 2010). Further, if 
immigrant populations are settling in areas with higher levels of violent crime, then greater crime 
declines may simply reflect the higher starting crime rate, and population compositions may have 
little, if anything, to do with the change in crime (Ramey, 2013). Conversely, if there are 
immigrant population and subsequent violent crime changes in communities despite initially 
higher crime rates, the foreign-born populations and the influence of U.S. conceptualizations of 
race and ethnicity may indeed be part of the community-crime decline story. 
For example, Table 4.3 presents the results of crosstabulations for the number of 
neighborhoods by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type that experienced more change in 
their foreign-born Hispanic and foreign-born non-Hispanic populations. First, of the 154 
neighborhoods that experienced a one standard deviation above the mean change in their foreign-
born population (2009-2000), it is apparent that many immigrants are choosing to live in 
ethnoracially integrated communities. This suggests that there is more change in foreign-born 
populations in communities that are less socially disorganized, and with lower violent crime, than 
what is reported in predominantly Black or predominantly Hispanic communities. Therefore, in 
integrated communities where there are changes in the foreign-born population, statistically 
significant changes in crime may indeed have something to do with the dynamic nature of 
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community population composition. Although there are not statistically significant differences 
between the neighborhood types where there was at least a one standard deviation above the 
mean change in the foreign born population by ethnicity (n=154), there is a statistically 
significant difference between neighborhood types that experienced this change in these foreign-
born populations compared with neighborhood types that experienced less than a one standard 
deviation change in the foreign-born populations (n=620). 
Table 4.3: Crosstabulation of neighborhood types and increase in Foreign-born by Ethnicity 
 
 
 
 Second, more predominantly white and more predominantly Black communities 
experienced increases in foreign-born non-Hispanic residents than in Hispanic foreign-born 
residents; however, integrated communities experienced the most growth in their proportions of 
the population that were foreign-born (Hispanic and non-Hispanic). This descriptive finding 
suggests that ethnoracial and/or socioeconomic characteristics of communities differ and may 
influence where immigrants choose, and are financially able, to settle. Overwhelmingly, non-
Hispanic foreign-born residents settled in integrated communities; this may be because they enjoy 
the ethnoracial diversity provided in an integrated community as well as be in a financial position 
to choose to settle in areas that are not as disadvantaged as Black communities, (but are less 
advantaged/expensive than white communities). Based on the neighborhood types where 
Hispanic foreign-born immigrants tended to settle, Hispanic immigrants were either better 
financially prepared to settle in predominantly white communities or, like the non-Hispanic 
White 14 22 36
Black 10 17 27
Hispanic 8 4 12
Integrated 25 54 79
Total 57 97 154
Ethnoracial 
Neighborhood 
Type
Increase in 
Foreign-born 
Hispanic 
Population
Increase in 
Foreign-born 
non-Hispanic 
Population
Total
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immigrant groups, they too are financially able to settle in integrated communities and enjoy 
ethnoracial diversity. It is not clear from the current analyses if integrated communities begin as 
predominantly white or Black until immigrants make these communities their home, but it is 
possible that as more immigrant groups settle in communities of a predominant ethnoracial type 
(white or Black), the community changes from one characterized by one ethnoracial population to 
an integrated community. 
It is interesting to note that increases in the foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ population 
occurred in twice as many predominantly Hispanic communities (n=8) as increases of the 
foreign-born non-Hispanic/Latin@ population in predominantly Hispanic communities (n=4). 
But, in Chicago, there were far fewer predominantly Hispanic communities, compared to other 
community types, where there were increases in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population. This 
may suggest that, all things equal, changes in immigrant populations outside of ethnic enclaves 
will predict increases, or smaller decreases in crime due to the social isolation that 
Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant populations may experience. Moreover, results of a Chow test 
confirm that there are significant differences in the prediction of change in foreign-born 
populations on changes in violent crime rates by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood types. 
Therefore, analyses of the effects of foreign-born populations on changes in crime will progress 
by examining foreign-born populations and community characteristics by neighborhoods 
(descriptive statistics Table 4.4) of each predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type. 
White Neighborhoods 
The current work includes data for 146 neighborhoods that, in 2000, were predominantly 
white (at least 70% of the residents self-identified as white, non-Hispanic). Further, in 2000 the 
Decennial Census reported that on average, roughly 16% of the population in white communities 
self-identified as foreign-born. Within the foreign-born populations in predominantly white 
communities there were, on average, nearly four times more non-Hispanic foreign-born residents 
(13%) than Hispanic foreign-born residents (3%). The violent crime rate per 1,000 residents 
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ranged from zero to 92; however, on average there were 6 violent crimes per 1,000 residents. 
Across all 146 white communities, the disadvantage index was low, ranging from -2 to 0.4; the 
average disadvantage index score was -1.2, meaning that across these white communities the 
majority of residents held at least a high school diploma, were working, few- if any- were living 
below the poverty line, and there was a low proportion of female-headed households with 
children in the neighborhood. Further, residents in predominantly white communities tended to 
own their own homes and/or, were residents of the community for at least five years (residential 
instability index ?̅? =  0.01). 
Black Neighborhoods 
 
 Across the Chicago communities included in this dissertation, there are consistencies 
with previous studies on differences in crime and community structure by predominant 
ethnoracial neighborhood composition (Peterson and Krivo, 2010; Krivo, Peterson and Kuhl, 
2009). Not surprisingly, compared to predominantly white neighborhoods, the 310 Black 
communities in the current analyses experienced both higher violent crime in 2000 and a larger 
decline in violent crime 2000-2012 (?̅? = −3.6 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̅? = −8.5 respectively). Descriptively, Black 
communities had a much smaller foreign-born population overall (?̅? = 1.7%) compared to white 
(?̅? = 15.9%), Hispanic (?̅? = 41.9%) and Integrated neighborhoods (?̅? = 29.3%). On average, 
predominantly Black neighborhoods had more non-Hispanic foreign-born residents (?̅? = 1.0%) 
than Hispanic foreign-born (?̅? = 0.8%); this stands in contrast with predominantly white 
communities that were on average, losing, or not gaining, non-Hispanic foreign-born residents. In 
2000, the proportion of young male residents was higher in Black (?̅? = 7.0%) than white       
(?̅? = 5.8%) and equal to integrated communities (?̅? = 7.4%). Further, the level of disadvantage, 
on average, was higher (?̅? = 0.8%) than the level of disadvantage in all other neighborhood types 
and there was a much smaller proportion of married with children family structures in the 
community (?̅? = 3.3%). 
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Hispanic Neighborhoods 
 As noted throughout communities and crime research, in predominantly Hispanic 
communities (n=92), the average (2000) level of disadvantage (?̅? = 0.2), and residential 
instability (?̅? = 0.01) fell between that of Black and white neighborhoods. Further, on average, 
Hispanic communities had a greater proportion of the community population who were male 
between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four years (?̅? = 10%) . These 92 communities also had a 
proportion of married with children family structures (?̅? = 10%) in the population equal to that 
in white communities, compared to integrated and Black neighborhoods  
(?̅? =  7.6% 𝑎𝑛𝑑 3.3% respectively). Moreover, on average, predominantly Hispanic 
communities had a violent crime rate (?̅? = 9.6) that was more than 50% lower than the average 
crime rate in Black neighborhoods (?̅? = 21.07), and higher than what was reported in white 
neighborhoods (?̅? = 6); the change in violent crime (2012-2000) decreased more in Hispanic 
neighborhoods (?̅? = −8.4%) than it did in Black neighborhoods (?̅? = −8.5%). Predominantly 
Hispanic communities in 2000 had, on average, a great deal more foreign-born residents 
(?̅? = 41.9%) than any other predominant ethnoracial type neighborhood. There was a larger 
percent of Hispanic foreign-born residents from Mexico residing in Hispanic neighborhoods  
(?̅? = 36.3%) than there were Hispanic foreign-born residents from other Hispanic/Latino nations 
(?̅? = 3.1%). Interestingly, although the average Hispanic community tract population was 
decreasing (?̅? = −286), the average change in the percent foreign-born Hispanic residents from 
nations other than Mexico remained stable, and the percent foreign-born Hispanic from Mexico 
decreased (?̅? = −2.3). 
Integrated Neighborhoods 
 Finally, in communities with an integrated ethnoracial population (n=226), there was a 
large foreign-born population (?̅? = 29.3%), and the foreign-born population was diverse with 
roughly half self-identifying Hispanic/Latin@ ethnicity (?̅? = 14.9%) and the other half non-
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Hispanic (?̅? = 14.4%). The 2000 violent crime rate (?̅? = 7.7) was lower than the rate in both 
Hispanic (?̅? = 9.6) and Black communities (?̅? = 21.07). Like in predominantly white 
communities, integrated communities have lower levels of disadvantage (?̅? = −0.5) and 
residential instability (?̅? = −0.2) compared to the predominantly Black or Hispanic 
neighborhoods. Further, the proportion of an average integrated community population that was 
male between 15 and 24 years of age (?̅? = 7.4%), and/or in a married with children family 
structure (?̅? = 7.6%) falls between the same measures for Black or Hispanic neighborhoods. 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics by Predominant Ethnoracial Neighborhood Types 
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MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS: FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION CHANGES ON CHANGES IN CRIME 
BY ETHNORACIAL NEIGHBORHOOD TYPES 
To test hypothesis four, that there are differential effects of changes in the immigrant 
population by ethnicity and predominant ethnoracial neighborhood types on changes in crime, the 
analyses proceed as follows. First, ten OLS models, in step-wise fashion, examine the effect of 
foreign-born population concentrations by ethnicity, changes in foreign-born ethnic populations, 
Hispanic/Latino nativity, and the change the Hispanic foreign-born by nativity while controlling 
for predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type (white neighborhoods as reference). A subsequent 
set of models with controls for predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type and a control for 
spatial autocorrelation of model errors is conducted next. Then, each of the ten regression models 
are conducted separately by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type. The results of the first 
ten regression models that include predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type controls, (Table 
4.5), do not reveal a statistically significant influence of foreign-born populations on changes in 
violent crime across Black, white, Hispanic and integrated neighborhoods. The results presented 
in Table 4.5 suggest that the within-group changes evident in the results presented without 
neighborhood type controls (Table 4.1) may be misspecified models14.  Although the results in 
Table 4.5 are consistent with the bulk of previous immigration and crime studies that conclude 
there is no relationship between immigrant population community composition and crime, 
(National Academies Press, 2015; Ousey and Kubrin, 2018), the comparison of results between 
models with and without ethnoracial type neighborhood context suggest that ethnoracial 
neighborhood type community context is important in immigration-crime study.  
Recognizing that neighboring census tracts will be more similar than those that are 
further apart, Table 4.5.1 presents results of the first ten regression models with the control for the 
                                                     
14 The R2 for all models in Table 4.1 is 0.47, AIC = 6477.2; for models in Table 4.5 the R2 is 0.49, AIC 
6372.6. The Pseudo R2 for models in Table 4.5.1 is 0.50, and AIC = 6133.4. 
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spatial autocorrelation of model errors. There are no substantive differences between the results 
of the changes in foreign-born populations on changes in violent crime with or without the 
control for spatial autocorrelation of errors. Further, moving now to discuss OLS regression 
models conducted on neighborhood types separately (Table 4.6 series), reveals a very different, 
more complex, story- one that continues to confirm that community structure(s) matter. 
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Table 4.5: OLS Regression of Foreign-born on changes in violent crime with community type controls 
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Table 4.5.1: OLS Regression of Foreign-born on changes in violent crime with community type controls and Spatial Error (λ) 
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White Neighborhoods 
Turning to the results of the ordinary least squares regression models (Table 4.6) for 
predominantly white communities, where the violent crime rate in 2000 was higher there were 
statistically significant, greater declines in violent crime between 2000 and 2012 (B=-0.6***).  
Further, Consistent with Ramey’s (2013) study, predominantly white communities with a change 
in the Hispanic/Latin@ population in 2000 (model three) predicts a statistically significant 
decrease in the community violent crime rate (B= -0.38**). In other words, in predominantly 
white communities with average community characteristics, an average foreign-born Hispanic 
population concentration, and average change in the foreign-born Hispanic population,  a one 
percent increase in the Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population predicts 4 fewer violent crimes 
in the community15.This finding supports previous cross-sectional immigration and crime 
research; yet, this model lacks the time elements truly necessary to account for causal 
relationships between residential instability, disadvantage and crime.   
In white Chicago neighborhoods, more residential instability in 2000 predicted increases 
in violent crime (range: B= 1.9*** to B= 2.4***). Moreover, white communities with more 
disadvantage predict higher crime, and where there were changes in ethnic heterogeneity- 
measured as change in the percent foreign-born Hispanic and change in the foreign-born Hispanic 
from Mexico, the models predict higher violent crime (or less of a decrease in violent crime 
2000-2012). Therefore, the models for white communities that do account for changes in the 
foreign-born population largely support social disorganization theory. For example, in 
                                                     
15 To calculate the change in violent crime in white communities with average levels of control 
characteristics, the following is the OLS regression equation with values for B0 through B6 and 
corresponding means, where B0 is the constant, B1 is the regression coefficient for change in foreign-born 
Hispanic, B2 is the regression coefficient for percent foreign-born Hispanic, B3 is the regression coefficient 
for percent young male, B4 is the regression coefficient for percent families married with children, B5 is 
the regression coefficient for the disadvantage index, B6 is the regression coefficient for residential 
instability and B7 is the regression coefficient for prior violent crime rate. Each B is multiplied by the 
corresponding variable mean in white communities (x1…x7). Therefore, Model 4: 
 𝑌(𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒) = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1(𝑥1) + 𝐵2(𝑥2) + 𝐵3(𝑥3) + 𝐵4(𝑥4) + 𝐵5(𝑥5) + 𝐵6(𝑥6) + 𝐵7(𝑥7) 
3.6 = 0.734 +(-0.27*1) + (0.25*.5)) + (.37*5.8) + (0.07*6.6) + (0.86*-1.2) + (2.4*0) 
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predominantly white communities with average community characteristics, a one percent increase 
in the foreign-born Hispanic population predicts nearly 4 more violent crimes (3.6). 
Furthermore, keeping in mind that only fourteen of the 146 predominantly white 
neighborhoods experienced a one standard deviation above the mean increase in the percent 
foreign-born Hispanic population, the concentration of Hispanic foreign-born residents ranged 
between one and nine percent. It appears that predominantly white communities were very 
sensitive to changes in the foreign-born Hispanic population and this may be because in most of 
the white neighborhoods there were so few Hispanic foreign-born residents in the community to 
begin with. Any ethnoheterogeneity introduced into the population may have had an indirect, or 
direct, effect on increases in violent crime. Perhaps, this change in our immigrant population 
(increases in the foreign-born from Latin nations, particularly Mexico) that has occurred since the 
conceptualization of Shaw and McKay’s social disorganization theory is now evident only when 
the foreign-born are disaggregated by ethnicity. 
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Black Neighborhoods 
 Turning now to the results of OLS regression models conducted on the 310 
predominantly Black communities, there are some effects of foreign-born population 
concentrations, changes in the foreign-born populations and changes in violent crime. The base 
model (Model 1, see Table 4.6.1) confirms that across this subset of communities, more 
disadvantage (2000) predicted a greater increase in the violent crime rate (B=4.12**); however, 
residential instability predicts the opposite (B= -2.7**). Further, a higher violent crime rate in 
2000 predicted a greater decrease, or much smaller increase, in violent crime 2000-2012 
(B= -0.7***). Moreover, all things equal, once the change in the foreign-born population is 
considered (Model 2), an increase in the foreign-born population predicts a significantly larger 
decrease, or smaller increase, in the violent crime rate despite the foreign-born population 
concentration, disadvantage, residential instability and the existing 2000 violent crime rate 
(B= -0.7**). Interestingly, an increase in the (2000 - 2009) Hispanic foreign-born population 
(Model 4) predicts a significantly larger decline in violent crime rates (B= -0.8***) than the 
decline evident in model two that included a measure for change in the overall foreign-born 
population. The result in Model 8 suggests that the change in a Black community’s foreign-born 
population from Mexico predicted a large, statistically significant decrease (or smaller increase) 
in violent crime (2012-2000) (B= -1.01***). Further, model ten sheds light on how diversity 
within the Hispanic foreign-born population predicts changes in crime; where there was a 
concentration of Hispanic foreign-born residents from nations other than Mexico, there was a 
statistically significant, larger, decrease in the violent crime rate (B=-4.6**).  
It is likely that the effects of changes in the foreign-born population on changes in violent 
crime rates in Black neighborhoods reflect two things: first, and consistent with previous 
immigration-crime studies, where there is a small proportion of foreign-born residents in the 
Black Chicago communities, a measurable increase in the foreign-born population contributes to 
greater declines in violent crime. Vélez (2009) found that in the most disadvantaged 
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communities, increases in the immigrant population operate to bolster social organizing 
community characteristics and thus, indirectly contribute to decreases in violence (Vélez, 2009). 
Second, the nativity of the foreign-born population in a Black community matters. Although the 
statistically significant result of a concentration of a non-Mexican foreign-born population on 
changes in violent crime may exist simply because more non-Mexican foreign-born people live in 
predominantly Black communities, this result reveals the importance of studying why ethnicity 
and nativity in community level immigration and crime research differentially affect changes in 
violent crime. It could be that non-Mexican immigrants move into predominantly Black 
communities because these are the neighborhoods that are most affordable for them, or it could be 
that non-Mexican immigrants, those from Cuba and the Dominican Republic, have darker skin 
tones as well as speak in a Spanish dialect that is different from the Spanish spoken by native-
born Hispanics (Daniel, 2002; Díaz-Campos and Navarro-Galisteo, 2009; Zentella, 1990). Thus, 
these immigrant groups can get their start in the U.S. living near other foreign-born residents who 
speak a similar dialect, who look somewhat physically similar to the existing community 
residents, and who share in some of their experiences with U.S. conceptualizations of race, 
ethnicity, and resulting prejudice, discrimination and racism (sociological salience principle). 
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Table 4.6: OLS Regression of Foreign-Born Populations in White Communities on Changes in Violent Crime 
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Table 4.6.1: OLS Regressions of Foreign-Born Populations in Black Communities on Changes in Violent Crime 
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Hispanic Neighborhoods 
Moving to the presentation of regression results for the 92 predominantly Hispanic 
neighborhoods examined in the current work, Table 4.6.2 offers support for the idea that there are 
differential effects of the foreign-born Hispanic population by nativity on changes in violent 
crime rates (2012-2000). All things equal, in predominantly Hispanic communities, despite 
disadvantage and prior (2000) violent crime rates, model ten suggests that an increase in the 
population of Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born residents from nations other than Mexico predicted a 
significantly greater decrease in the violent crime rate (B=-0.4**). That is, in Hispanic 
communities with average levels of violent crime, disadvantage, residential instability, an average 
percent of the population that is young and male, as well as an average proportion of residents in 
married family structures, every one percent more than the average population concentration that 
was foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ from nations other than Mexico (?̅? = 3.1%) predicts a 
decrease in community crime by roughly 7 violent crimes16. This result is similar to the results 
presented for predominantly Black communities where there was an inverse effect of a non-
Mexican, Hispanic, foreign-born population concentration on violent crime rates. 
Integrated Neighborhoods 
 
 The ordinary least squares regression results for the 226 integrated communities (Table 
4.6.3) examined in the current work depart, at least somewhat, from those for other neighborhood 
types. In integrated communities, none of the usual crime predicting structural characteristics 
(control variables) significantly predict changes in the violent crime rate until the foreign-born 
populations are disaggregated by ethnicity (foreign-born non-Hispanic, foreign-born Hispanic). 
Where crime rates were higher in 2000, there were greater changes in the violent crime rate 
                                                     
16 The increase in crime (Y) was calculated similarly for Hispanic communities as it was for white 
communities (see footnote 12). 
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 (B=-0.8); however, in integrated communities neither the aggregate foreign-born population nor 
foreign-born population by ethnicity predicted significant changes in violent crime. Moreover, in 
models nine and ten, the concentration of Hispanic foreign-born residents from nations other than 
Mexico- not the change in this population- predicts a statistically significant, larger, decrease in 
the violent crime rate (B= -0.32*** and -0.38*** respectively). 
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Table 4.6.2: OLS Regressions of Foreign-Born Populations in Hispanic Communities on Change in Violent Crime  
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Table 4.6.3: OLS Regressions of Foreign-Born Populations in Integrated Communities on Change in Violent Crime 
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SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS: FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN 
VIOLENT CRIME BY PREDOMINANT ETHNORACIAL NEIGHBORHOOD TYPE NEIGHBORHOODS 
 Overall, the results of the OLS regression models by ethnoracial neighborhood types 
present mixed support for hypothesis 4. There are differential effects of foreign-born populations 
by ethnicity (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) on changes in violent crime across neighborhood types. 
In white neighborhoods, increases in the Hispanic foreign-born population predict increases in the 
change in violent crime rates. For Black neighborhoods, where the initial population of Hispanic 
foreign-born residents is considerably smaller than in white neighborhoods, increases in the 
Hispanic foreign-born population predict greater decreases, or smaller increases, in the change in 
violent crime rates. Although there are differential effects of foreign-born population 
concentrations and changes in these populations at different levels of disaggregation, (thus 
supporting Kubrin and colleague’s assertion (2016) that the effects of foreign-born populations on 
violent crime are complex), these findings do not necessarily suggest that overall, foreign-born 
populations in communities affect violent crime. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
 
Early Chicago School scholarship theorized that immigrant populations would move into 
the communities most affordable for them, and immigrants would then relocate as soon as 
financially able. The current work returns to Chicago to systematically examine how, in the new 
millennium, changes in immigration affects change in violent crime. The high-crime/delinquency 
Chicago communities examined in Shaw and McKay’s (1942) seminal work were economically 
disadvantaged with little access to socially organizing resources; these areas, particularly within 
the zone of transition (Burgess, 1924; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw and McKay, 1942) also had 
larger, churning, immigrant, and migrant Black populations. That immigrant populations were 
also well represented in the communities with the most crime enabled members of the public and 
polity to anecdotally connect immigration to crime thus offering support for anti-immigrant 
policies/behaviors. Yet, based on their empirical work, Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that 
although immigrant populations contributed to residential instability and poverty in some areas, 
the immigrant groups were not inherently criminogenic; rather, community structure drove 
residents’ vulnerability to, or protection from, crime (Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw and McKay, 
1942).  
Social disorganization, measured only as structural community characteristics (i.e., 
disadvantage, residential mobility and poverty) to explain differential community crime rates has, 
once again, fallen out of favor with many criminologists interested in community immigrant 
population and crime relationships. Based on empirical findings from studies of crime in ethnic 
enclaves, scholars have concluded that structural explanations for the crime declines that occurred 
in communities with large concentrations of immigrants, increased poverty, few residents in 
professional occupations and linguistic isolation were insufficient, at best. Instead, the immigrant 
revitalization perspective has taken center stage to explain that, in large part, due to the 
mechanism of immigrant self-selection (Bauer et. al., 2001; Butcher and Piehl, 1995; Tonry, 
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1997) immigrant concentration in a community strengthens social organization. As immigrant 
resident settlement re-populates disadvantaged, urban neighborhoods (Reid et al., 2005; Vélez 
2009) immigrant groups rely on their social capital (Martinez et al., 2004) to bolster social 
organization and the local economy (National Academies, 2015; Sampson, 2008; Vélez 2009). 
However, the lion’s share of immigration and crime studies that found evidence of immigrant 
revitalization were cross-sectional and relied on a pan-ethnic foreign-born measure of a 
community’s immigrant population (Desmond and Kubrin, 2009; Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012; 
Lee and Martinez, 2002; Lee et al, 2001; Martinez, 2000; Martinez et al., 2004; 2008; Morenoff 
and Sampson, 1997; Nielsen et al., 2005; Ramey, 2013; Stowell and Martinez, 2007). Once 
research expanded to include more than one time point, diverse communities (rather than ethnic 
enclaves in cities with predictable settlement patterns), and disaggregated foreign-born 
populations, results did not consistently support immigrant revitalization; rather, criminologists 
concluded that immigration had either no effect or an inverse effect on crime (Kubrin et al., 2016; 
National Academies, 2015; Stowell, 2007). Yet, our understanding remained limited regarding 
changes in community crime where immigrant populations, disaggregated by ethnicity and/or 
nation of origin, in more diverse communities, predicted differential crime effects.  
Throughout Chapters One and Two, this dissertation presented arguments that differential 
crime results in community-level immigration and crime research may depend on mechanisms 
within community ethnoracial contexts in tandem with immigrant population ethnicity and ethnic 
nation of origin. There is reason to believe that mechanisms of immigrant self-selection, 
characteristics of some migrant groups, and community context of reception explain why there 
are differential crime effects of immigrant populations across previous immigration-crime 
studies. To examine potential differential changes in crime where there were changes in 
immigrant populations, this dissertation built on previous works by including more than one time 
point and disaggregating the foreign-born population across communities in a mid-western city 
with many immigrant groups, a long history of immigrant settlement, and a diverse yet segregated 
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city. Moreover, the hypotheses remained consistent with the findings of previous immigration and 
crime literature; specifically, that changes in communities’ proportions of immigrant populations 
by ethnicity and nation of origin influence inverse changes in crime. Using data from several 
secondary sources, the current work expands immigration and community crime literature, guided 
by the frameworks of social disorganization and immigrant revitalization, to examine how recent 
changes in ethnic immigrant populations affect changes in violent crime within ethnoracial 
community contexts.  
Unlike the immigrants of the early nineteenth and twentieth centuries, immigrants in the 
new millennium are migrating primarily from Hispanic/Latin@ and, increasingly, Asian as well 
as African nations of origins. Like the findings in Stowell and Martinez’s (2009) work on port 
cities on the East coast, West coast, and Southwest, the current study found that immigrant 
populations in contemporary America were not necessarily living in the most disadvantaged 
communities in Chicago; rather, immigrants were increasingly settling outside of ethnic enclaves, 
in integrated communities, with less economic disadvantage, where residents tended to have at 
least a high school diploma, and where there were fewer female headed households. In other 
words, consistent with Stowell’s (2007) work, many immigrants were moving into communities 
that were, to some extent, insulated from crime producing social disorganization mechanisms. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that this study does not find support for hypothesis one, that there is 
an inverse relationship between changes in a community immigrant population and change in 
crime, but instead finds support for the existing body of literature that concludes there is no 
relationship between changes in the proportion of a community’s immigrant population and 
changes in violent crime (see National Academies Press, 2010 and Ousey and Kubrin, 2017 for 
review). However, the current work also finds support for Kubrin and colleague’s (2016) work, 
once the foreign-born population is disaggregated by ethnicity, Hispanic/Latin@ nation of origin, 
and settlement community context, the conclusion of a null relationship between immigration and 
crime is not necessarily the end of the story. 
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The effect of changes in immigrant populations on changes in community violent crime 
rates varied- depending on the predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type where the proportion 
of the community’s immigrant populations changed, the immigrant population’s ethnicity, and 
Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants’ nation of origin. Rumbaut (2009) argues that migrants from 
Hispanic and Latin@ nations of origin are not homogenous; this assertion together with Massey 
and Sánchez’s (2010) finding that immigrant assimilation is often influenced by the native-born 
community population, offer a hint at the mechanisms that may underlie the differential results 
found in this and previous immigration-crime research. Results discussed in Chapter Four offer 
some support for social disorganization theory; however, the results are complex and one such 
complexity found in this study rests with the measurement of immigrant populations by ethnicity, 
and, more specifically, the measurement of Hispanic/Latin@ populations from Mexico. It is 
interesting to note that in this dissertation, similar to what has been found in previous studies on 
immigrant revitalization, in predominantly Black communities, changes in violent crime rates are 
influenced more by the change in foreign-born populations than what is evident in other 
neighborhood types. 
WHAT IS IT ABOUT ETHNICITY AND HISPANIC/LATIN@ NATION OF ORIGIN? 
 
Shaw and McKay (1942) found that in Chicago, in the mid-twentieth century, crime was 
a social fact less about the people who inhabited a neighborhood, (recall that Shaw and McKay 
did disaggregate the immigrant population by nation of origin), and more about the structure of 
the place itself. They argued that some places were more conducive to being home to those with 
fewer financial resources, lower levels of education, fewer professional skills, and recent 
migrants while other places were better suited for those with more wealth, more education, skill, 
opportunities for economic growth, and more time spent in the United States to build both 
economic and social capital (Shaw and McKay, 1942). In Chapter Four, descriptive analyses of 
Chicago communities (2000) confirmed that community structures still varied by many of the 
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same characteristics noted in Shaw and McKay’s early (1942) work, and these community 
characteristics remained fairly stable between 2000 and 2009. Moreover, as Peterson and Krivo 
(2010) assert, the ethnoracial segregation and community structure disparities evident across 
communities continue to stress the importance of accounting for community population 
demographics in meso-level crime research.  
Expanding research on the effects of immigrant populations (post-1965) on violent crime 
in the U.S. requires recognition of not only how racial segregation operates in community-crime 
scholarship but, due to institutionalized racism and ethnic discrimination, calls for an 
understanding of how immigrant population race and ethnicity fit within the U.S. ethnoracial 
regime. The lesser-known legacy of the Bracero movement of 1942 established dark-skinned 
Spanish-speaking U.S. residents, as well as documented and undocumented Mexican migrants as 
poor, less-educated, low-skilled and less capable/worthy of living in communities rich in 
economic and human capital (Chavez, 2016; Ferraro, 2014). From this legacy, and the well-
known legacy of Black slavery, institutionalized racism and ethnic discrimination continue to 
influence popular ethnoracial stereotypes, home lending, home ownership, public school funding, 
educational access/quality, and employment opportunities (Peterson and Krivo, 2010). Therefore, 
not finding support for hypothesis two, that changes in the foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ 
population had an inverse effect on changes in violent crime, but instead finding differential 
effects of changes in immigrant populations based on immigrant ethnicity and Hispanic/Latin@ 
nation of origin on changes in violent crime are not surprising.  
Recognizing that race and ethnicity structure social life across communities, it stands to 
reason that immigrant populations in Chicago communities are inducted into the 
ethnoracial/social class hierarchy soon after their arrival in the U.S. (National Academies, 2015). 
However, as noted by Bonilla-Silva (2002), immigrant populations are likely settling into a tri-
racial (i.e., “white”, “honorary white” and “collective black” (Bonilla-Silva, 2002:4)) rather than 
bi-racial (i.e., white, Black) hierarchy.  The results presented in Chapter Four of the current work 
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offer partial support for the idea that changes in community violent crime are inversely related to 
changes in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population by Hispanic/Latin@ nation of origin.  
Immigrant populations that are non-Hispanic/Latin@ and light-skinned (Eastern European or 
from some Asian nations) may join the White strata and, with little fanfare, settle in the most 
advantaged communities that they can afford. Non-Mexican, light-skinned, Hispanic/Latin@, 
(and some from Western Europe) immigrant populations may join Bonilla-Silva’s theorized 
“honorary white” class with only opportunities to settle in lower crime, less advantaged, 
neighborhoods. Finally, darker-skinned immigrant populations from disadvantaged nations (i.e., 
Vietnam, Mexico, Africa) particularly those who are darker-skinned, join Bonilla-Silva’s 
theorized “collective Black” class with settlement opportunities limited to the most 
disadvantaged, higher crime neighborhoods.  
In any case, if the U.S. does indeed have a tri-racial hierarchy, (or even a new bi-racial 
white and non-white hierarchy) in the new millennium, lighter-skinned non-Hispanic/Latin@ 
immigrants to the U.S., as well as the lighter-skinned Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants from nations 
other than Mexico may be met with less anti-immigrant sentiment and discrimination than 
Mexican immigrants. As noted throughout Chavez’s (2013) work, Latino threat operates to 
construct all Hispanic/Latin@ persons (particularly new immigrants) as Mexican, thus placing 
this ethnic population in a lower social stratum- and the legacy of the Bracero program may 
continue to fuel native-born prejudice as well as the social and economic exclusion of darker-
skinned, Spanish-speaking immigrants. As argued throughout this dissertation, immigrant 
population ethnicity(ies) may constrain community settlement choice, social/economic exclusion 
of immigrant populations in some communities more than in others and, contribute to changes in 
crime.  
The use of broad, pan-ethnic, foreign-born measures in much of the previous 
immigration-crime research does not capture the heterogeneity of the foreign-born population nor 
allow for better understanding how changes in the proportions of ethnic immigrant groups in 
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communities affect community structure, social organization, or social control. As seen in much 
of the immigrant revitalization research and suggested by the results of the current work in 
predominantly Black neighborhoods, communities suffering from higher crime, de-population 
and cumulative disadvantage benefit from the social organization and economic stimulation 
driven by immigrant settlement. Moreover, without disaggregating foreign-born populations it is 
difficult to determine if all immigrant populations affect community change similarly, or if 
heterogeneity in the ethnic immigrant population matter for better understanding community 
settlement, community organization and safety. 
IMMIGRATION IN COMMUNITY CONTEXT 
 
Over time, variations in crime at the community level have been explained by the 
opportunities for crime in the area, the routines of residents, levels of collective efficacy, and the 
ability for residents to organize against social problems (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993, Bursik and 
Webb, 1982; Krivo, Peterson and Kuhl, 2009; Vélez, 2009). Although the current work does not 
have direct measures for crime opportunities, nor residents’ routines, it returns to the early work 
of the Chicago School and relies on measures of social (dis)organization, ethnoracial community 
composition, and population change to predict changes in violent crime. Peterson and Krivo 
consistently find, in their work on ethnoracially segregated communities and crime, that areas 
with the fewest quality resources for upward social mobility are predominantly Black and, to a 
lesser extent, predominantly Hispanic (Peterson and Krivo, 2010). For this reason, the current 
work examined the importance of ethnoracial neighborhood compositions as contextual clues to 
variation in crime where immigrant populations lived and where the proportion of immigrants in 
community populations were changing.  
The current study finds mixed support for hypothesis four, that immigrant population 
changes and related changes in violent crime will vary based on the predominant ethnoracial 
neighborhood type of the host community. Interestingly, the current analyses revealed differential 
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effects of immigrant population concentrations, and/or changes in the proportion of a community 
population that was foreign-born until predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type was included 
in the statistical models. Therefore, the influence of community context is one key to 
understanding the competing results found in this, and other, immigration and crime studies. 
Ethnoracial community segregation structures residential life in ways that benefit 
residents of predominantly white communities and block opportunities for residents of 
predominantly Black and minority communities (see Peterson and Krivo, 2010 for review). 
Further, some notable research on immigration and community crime has revealed a revitalizing 
effect in depopulated, predominantly Black and minority, urban neighborhoods as immigrants 
move into and become an influential proportion of the neighborhood population (Vélez, 2009). 
Consistent with the immigrant revitalization hypothesis, in predominantly Black communities in 
Chicago (2012-2000), increases in the proportion of Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born residents 
(particularly those from Hispanic/Latin@ nations other than Mexico) as well as increases in the 
non-Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population predicted statistically significant decreases in 
community violent crime. It may be that in predominantly Black, depopulated, communities, the 
existing (native-born) community population lacks the social organization required to resist the 
population composition changes and instead may ignore or welcome the changes to community 
social structures that result from a smaller, yet growing, immigrant population. This enables the 
growing immigrant population to bolster the local economy, build social capital and strengthen 
social organization thus insulating the community from crime (Vélez, 2009). 
Further, the current work found that most communities experiencing measurable change 
in the proportion of the community population that was foreign-born (2009-2000) were 
ethnoracially integrated and relatively lower in violent crime than predominantly Black and 
Hispanic communities; however, where there were larger population concentrations of non-
Hispanic immigrants, there were greater crime declines. It is not clear from the current analyses if 
integrated neighborhoods become ethnoracially integrated as a result of growing immigrant 
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populations in the community yet, even in ethnoracially integrated communities, concentrations 
of the Hispanic/Latin@ population from nations other than Mexico predicted decreases in violent 
crime. This finding likely reflects within-community population or structural dynamics, such as 
discrimination, that prevented (or discouraged) Mexican immigrants from participating fully in 
collective efficacy to drive similar crime declines. Again, these findings- despite controls for 
community structural characteristics- likely support the idea that, due at least in part to Latino 
threat, anti-immigrant sentiments, and discrimination, the community population and/or structure 
dynamics are different where there are changes in the proportion of Mexican immigrants in a 
neighborhood. Moreover, absent other social structure characteristics significantly influencing 
change in crime where there are concentrations of foreign-born residents in integrated 
communities, the inverse relationship of larger proportions of married families with children in 
the community and violent crime supports the concepts of both social capital and social 
organization. More adults in the community often translates into more informal controls, closed 
social capital, and supervision of youth in the community thus promoting community safety.  
Furthermore, findings suggest that, in Chicago, compared with neighborhoods of other 
predominant ethnoracial types, there were fewer predominantly Hispanic communities that 
experienced change in the proportion of Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants in the population. It could 
be that, Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants from nations other than Mexico choose Hispanic 
communities for settlement due to language or other cultural similarities, and are therefore able to 
strengthen community social organization. Perhaps, the native-born Hispanic residents who 
identify Mexico as their ancestral home and immigrant Mexican populations welcome hold onto 
Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants from other Latin nations and this strengthens the mechanisms 
necessary for crime control (like collective efficacy). Therefore, in Hispanic communities where 
there were changes in the community’s proportion of immigrants from Mexico there were not 
significant changes in crime- but where there were concentrations of Hispanic/Latin@ 
immigrants from other nations, violent crime decreased. It may be that the introduction of small 
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proportions of non-Mexican Hispanic immigrants into predominantly Hispanic communities 
strengthen crime controlling mechanisms just enough to decrease crime. These results emphasize 
the need for better understanding, and perhaps accounting for, the diverse histories of Spanish-
speaking foreign and native-born residents in community crime research.  
Without narrow, focused measures of the immigrant population, scholars and policy 
makers may miss key opportunities for addressing inequality and social justice issues specific to 
incoming migrant populations. Like the effects of non-Hispanic/Latin@ population changes on 
crime, where there were changes in a community’s proportion of Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants 
from nations other than Mexico there was an inverse relationship to changes in violent crime. 
This highlights the importance of disaggregating the Hispanic/Latin@ populations by nativity and 
ethnicity (i.e., native versus foreign-born, and foreign-born by ethnicity as well as 
Hispanic/Latino national origin) in social science immigration research. Further, as immigration 
policies and human conflict around the world continue to change, measures of immigrant 
populations should, at least, be disaggregated by ethnicity to aid our understanding of how 
immigrant populations shape and/or change community safety. Moreover, as seen in the current 
work, due to ethnoracial segregation across U.S. cities, including the ethnoracial characteristics of 
communities in community-level immigration-crime analyses are important. Community 
ethnoracial population composition is closely related to social and economic isolation, 
discriminatory practices, as well as community structure; it is necessary that we continue to 
recognize that the constructions of race and ethnicity structure social life in ways that may 
contribute to any differential effects of immigrant population changes on community safety. 
LIMITATIONS 
DEFINITION AND MEASURE OF COMMUNITY 
In sociological and criminological research, there have been literary discussions 
regarding the measurement of neighborhood and community constructs since Hunter and Suttles 
(1972) identified, and defined, four different measures of neighborhoods/communities (i.e., face 
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block, defended neighborhoods, community of limited liability, and expanded communities of 
limited liability). Each definition of Hunter and Suttles’ (1972) conceptualizations of 
neighborhoods/communities rely on how well residents in a geographical area know one another 
and/or how often they encounter one another to work toward a common political or economic 
goal (Hunter and Suttles, 1972). More recently, with expansive access to secondary, quantitative 
data, scholars who conduct research on communities/neighborhoods use either census tracts (see 
Graif and Sampson, 2009 for a discussion), community areas (Sampson and Graif, 2009), census 
block groups (Hipp, 2007), street segments (Weisburd et. al., 2004) or areas geographically 
centered on an individual residence or street block (see the operationalization of the egohood and 
review of neighborhood measurement in Hipp and Boessen, 2013) to measure 
communities/neighborhoods.  
The current work builds on a large body of quantitative criminological literature and uses 
the census-tract level of aggregation as its measure of community; however, the use of census 
tract measures may not fully capture the true population and/or geographic area that residents 
would identify as their community. The Chicago census tracts analyzed in this dissertation have, 
on average, roughly 3,500 residents and their populations were relatively stable between 2000 
and 2009. Therefore, the meso-level census tract operationalization of community used in this 
dissertation may span geographic area and population that is far larger than what Chicago 
residents consider part of their community or exclude some areas and population that residents 
might identify as part of their community.  
GENERALIZABILITY OF FINDINGS 
Given the expansive community and crime research that originated, and has continued for 
nearly a century, on Chicago neighborhoods, this dissertation examined the dynamic nature of 
communities, immigrant populations and violent crime across Chicago (2012-2000). The choice 
to examine communities across Chicago was driven by the rich quality, and large quantity, of 
well-known, theoretically driven, empirical, community-level studies on Chicago communities 
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together with the reliability and availability of social science data collected on violent crime, over 
time, at the census-tract level.  The current work adds to community-level immigration and crime 
research by examining violent crime changes across communities in a city with a long history of 
immigrant settlement, diverse immigrant groups, and less predictable settlement patterns than 
what has been noted in previous immigration-crime studies (for review, see National Academies 
Press, 2010 as well as Ousey and Kubrin, 2017). Yet, despite the number of communities 
included, history of rich community-level research, and quality measures available for the 
communities examined here (n= 814), this dissertation’s findings are limited to communities 
across Chicago (2012-2000). 
TIME MEASURES AND OMITTED VARIABLES 
Briefly noted in Chapter Four, simultaneity, endogeneity, and omitted variables are 
limitations in this, and other, community-level immigration and crime studies. As dynamic 
places, changes that occur in the community can influence changes in crime; however, changes in 
crime can also influence changes in community structure and populations (Becker, 2016; Hipp, 
2010; Kirk and Laub, 2010; Liska and Bellair, 1995). For example, while non-Hispanic 
immigrant populations grow in predominantly Black communities, this population change may 
directly or indirectly affect violent crime; likewise, as crime declined in predominantly Black 
communities, non-Hispanic immigrant populations may have seized the opportunity to live in a 
lower-crime neighborhood. However, as Boggess (2017) found, using Structural Equation 
Models (SEM) in her study on simultaneity in community-crime studies, in Los Angeles 
communities with stable levels of residential churn, change in community ethnoracial 
composition predicted greater increases in violent crime- except where there were also increases 
in the proportion of immigrants in the community population (Boggess, 2017). Therefore, due to 
the population stability of the Chicago communities examined in the current work, the use of 
measures at multiple time points, and findings fairly consistent with Boggess’ (2017) work, the 
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potential for reciprocal relationships between change in community characteristics and change in 
violent crime rates are worth noting but are not a grave concern.  
Many notable immigration and crime studies have contributed to our empirical and 
theoretical knowledge on the relationships between immigration, communities and crime; 
however, the cross-sectional nature of many of the previous studies limited our understanding of 
how changes in community characteristics can, over time, influence violent crime. This 
dissertation includes four time points, (2000 and 2012 for crime measures, 2000 and 2009 for 
census measures), thus including the most reliable data available at the census tract level for 
Chicago while attempting to ensure the proper temporal order of variables. Yet, as Liska and 
Bellair (1995) posit, community changes that influence change in crime occur slowly and over 
many years. Therefore, the short period of time included in this dissertation may fail to 
demonstrate the full impact of changes in immigrant populations on changes in community 
violent crime.  
The very nature of theoretical development, and empirical discovery in social science 
rests on the fact that social groups, behaviors, and organization are ever-changing. Within, and 
across, the Chicago communities analyzed in the current work, there may have been multiple 
competing mechanisms that were not measured for this dissertation’s analyses (i.e., 
discrimination, population cohesiveness, crime opportunities, documentation of immigrant 
populations, policing, and political/legal changes or influences). These omitted variables may 
have been working to directly or indirectly affect changes in violent crime. Moreover, as a 
community-level quantitative work that relies on secondary sources, this dissertation is limited to 
available, theoretically guided, measures and constructs. Therefore, there is ample opportunity for 
replication of this dissertation, replication using other time points and locations, as well as for 
conducting similar research that includes measures and concepts omitted from this project (i.e., 
discrimination within and between communities, documentation status of immigrant populations, 
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reasons for population migration by ethnicity and nation of origin, as well as measures of 
collective efficacy, and comparative works). 
Moreover, the current work accounts only for spatial autocorrelation as a nuisance in the 
regression models; it does not account for potential relationships between geographic location and 
proximity to tracts experiencing change in population, change in crime, nor change in the foreign-
born populations. It could be that change in any population, community characteristic or violent 
crime rate in one census tract affects related changes in a nearby or adjacent tract; that is, how the 
dependent variable (y) in tract (i) is affected by the independent variables in neighboring tracts 
(xi, xj …xn) (Morenoff and Sampson, 1997). Therefore, adding spatial lags of independent 
variables and/or examining the effect of predominant ethnoracial characteristics of nearby 
communities where there are changes in foreign-born populations will add another layer of depth 
to community-level immigration and crime study. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Building on previous communities, immigration and crime research, this study relied on 
the theoretical frameworks of social disorganization and immigrant revitalization; however, there 
are many avenues for theoretical development related to immigration, communities, and crime. 
Since the mid-1960s, the majority of the U.S. immigrant population has originated from 
Hispanic/Latin@ nations (Lopez and Bialik, 2017); however, scholars who intend to better 
understand links between immigration and crime should not use pan-ethnic or simple foreign-
born measures that imply the influence of all immigrant populations are the same in all 
communities (DiPietro and Bursik, 2015). Moreover, as seen in this dissertation, foreign-born 
populations are not all moving into strictly immigrant communities, ethnic enclaves, and/or those 
with concentrated disadvantage, nor do they impact identical changes in community violent crime 
rates. Further, in Chicago (2009-2000), Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant populations were not all 
settling in predominantly Hispanic communities. Roughly half of the Hispanic communities in 
this dissertation experienced changes in the proportion of immigrants in their populations; 
however, the effect of these population changes varied by immigrant populations’ ethnicity and 
Hispanic/Latin@ nation of origin. To advance criminological theory on the effects of immigration 
on community crime, criminologists should turn to confirming and testing mechanisms such as 
self-selection and community contexts of reception to explain why some immigrant populations 
settle into and revitalize some communities but not others. 
The current work does not provide evidence to suggest that there is something inherently 
criminogenic about immigrants from any nations and, based on decades of individual-level 
immigration and crime studies, immigrant populations remain no more criminogenic than native-
born populations. Yet, considering the differential results across communities where there were 
increases in immigrant populations (disaggregated by ethnicity and nativity) there remain 
numerous avenues for future study. Including more cities, more time points, different measures of 
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communities, and measuring theoretically guided concepts omitted from this dissertation may 
yield support for, or reveal different, explanations for the differential community effects of 
changing immigrant populations on changes in violent crime. 
The disciplines of criminology, sociology, and, demography, are in unique positions to 
design and conduct mixed-method, longitudinal research on communities in the United States and 
other nations where immigration regularly occurs. For example, there is a growing body of 
literature across the social sciences on the effects of immigration on resident perceptions 
of/attitudes toward immigrants (Naumann, Stoetzer, and Pietrantuono, 2018), and the relationship 
between immigration and crime (Piopiunik and Ruhose, 2017) in Europe.   
One opportunity for comparative criminological research- and prime for the replication of 
this dissertation- is research on immigration and crime in Europe, specifically in Germany or 
Russia, with measures for ethnic German17 and Turkish immigrants. The differential results found 
in this dissertation across neighborhood ethnoracial type, after disaggregation of the 
Hispanic/Latin@ population by nation of origin, are not all that different from what recent 
scholarship on the relationship between changes in the ethnic German population and crime 
across counties in Germany (Piopiunik and Ruhose, 2016). Piopiunik and Ruhose (2016) find that 
there are significant increases in crime in German counties where there are increases in ethnic 
German immigrants. Throughout Piopiunik and Ruhose’s (2016) study, it seems that social 
disorganization increases as ethnic German immigration to a county increases; thus, immigrant 
population growth suggests an indirect effect on crime. However, Piopiunik and Ruhose (2016) 
also emphasize that ethnic Germans are limited in their settlement county choices. Therefore, 
despite the typical characteristics of the ethnic German migrant population (young, linguistically 
isolated, low-skilled, disadvantaged, with low-levels of education) the structural characteristics of 
                                                     
17 Ethnic Germans are immigrants to Germany who are “descendants of German colonists who had 
migrated to Russia and other East European countries in the 18th and 19th century” who then migrate to live 
in Germany (Piopiunik and Ruhose, 2016). 
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the regions where ethnic immigrant populations increase can limit the immigrant population’s 
ability to strengthen mechanisms of social organization (Piopiunik and Ruhose, 2016). 
Perhaps more salient to the current work are the similarities of Turkish immigrant history 
in Germany to Mexican immigrant history in the United States. Whereas in the United States, the 
Bracero program brought low-skilled, less-educated, poor, Mexican migrant men to the United 
States to bolster the U.S. farm and field labor pool, Turkish migrants (also low-skilled, less-
educated, and, poor) were “guest workers” in Germany as part of the Gastarbeiter program who 
migrated after World War II to West Germany as part of the postwar reconstruction effort 
(Mandel, 2008; von Bieberstein, 2016). Turkish migrants have, historically, faced ethnoracial 
exclusion in Germany (von Bieberstein, 2016) like the ethnoracial “othering” (Latino threat) that 
many Mexican (native with Mexican ancestry and foreign-born) populations may experience in 
the United States. Research on Turkish immigrant populations in Germany has largely focused on 
employment and economic effects. However, meso-level immigration and crime research may 
benefit from comparative, ethnoracially disaggregated study (or at least disaggregation by nations 
of origin) on changes in immigration and changes in crime18.   
Moreover, in addition to comparative research, there are several other components in the 
study of immigration and crime that scholars can influence/actively participate in to further the 
body of immigration-community-crime studies. First, we must be clear in our definitions of 
ethnicity, race, and immigration. While the foreign-born measure used throughout early 
immigration and crime research was, for a long period of time, the only consistent measure of our 
immigrant population, the U.S. Census and other secondary sources have refined (to a small 
degree) how the immigrant population is identified and measured in official statistics. If, as is 
suggested by the findings in this dissertation, ethnicity and nation of origin play a role in 
                                                     
18 As recently as the 2011 Census, Germany reported that more than 22% of the population were foreign-
born; further, the German Federal Statistical Office (2016) notes that migrant nativity is predominantly 
from Asia, other European nations, and, Africa thus potentially offering many different nations of origin 
and perhaps study by ethnoracial disaggregation in the German immigrant population.  
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differential immigration-crime results, then scholars should continue to hone the 
operationalization of ethnicity. Further, we should work to influence official source 
methodologies to consistently use measurable, consensus definitions for the concept of ethnicity.  
The use of clear, consensus measures of immigrant populations by ethnicities can expand 
immigration and crime research by providing scholars and policy makers opportunities to identify 
the culturally-relative resources needed in communities with growing immigrant populations to 
best encourage social organization, collective efficacy, and community safety. For example, 
communities with growing immigrant populations from nations where neighbors are not to be 
trusted may benefit from intentional community-building events. Perhaps the growing immigrant 
population in a community is fluent in a language or dialect that has key words at odds with the 
languages or dialects spoken by the native-born population; in this case, a certain amount of 
revision may be necessary in community, school, legal, medical and criminal justice 
messaging/materials. Only systematic research that uses clear, consistent, measures of our 
immigrant populations can reveal needs that are specific to the various immigrant groups who 
live in our communities. 
Second, the very nature of community and social groups is change; to better understand 
how changes in community populations influence community structure and organization, 
longitudinal research is necessary. The current work used panel data from the American 
Community Survey, and the Decennial Census to create census tract change measures. In addition 
to collecting clear measures of immigrant populations, there is a need to continue collecting crime 
data at meso and micro units of aggregation across the United States (i.e., comparable census 
tract, block group units). Following the changes of the same communities, across multiple cities, 
over time, will be fruitful for discovering mechanisms and patterns that influence community 
organization, structure, and crime. Moreover, conducting longitudinal analyses on communities 
across the U.S. rather than limiting examinations to one city as was done in the current work, or 
  
104 
 
to cities with predictable immigrant populations and settlement patterns, will advance theoretical 
development as well as the generalizability of empirical findings. 
Third, including measures for property crime and assaults is important for providing a 
more comprehensive examination of any immigration-crime relationships. It may be that where 
there are significant changes in the proportion of community populations who are foreign-born, 
there are differential changes in property and violent crime rates. Scholars looking to include 
property crime and assault measures in immigration-crime research must be cognizant of the 
various reasons for under-reporting that occurs in areas with large immigrant populations; 
however, to gain a better understanding of immigration and community crime, scholars can build 
on the current work by including reliable measures of other crimes. Moreover, a comprehensive 
understanding of immigration and crime can aid policy makers and program directors to make 
targeted, culturally-relative revisions to programs and messaging that communities receive 
regarding crime, victimization, and working with local law enforcement. Such revisions to 
messaging can improve crime reporting and/or decrease fear of crime/fear of reporting crime. 
Culturally relative and appropriate policy/program changes to improve residents’ safety and 
security in increasingly diverse communities will not manifest without theoretical and empirical 
advances to immigrant population-specific scholarship that also accounts for community context. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a necessary, key component to identifying why 
immigrant populations with different ethnic backgrounds, from different nations, may influence 
crime is expanding ethnic minority representation and scholarship across the social sciences. A 
mixed-method approach to immigration, communities, and crime research requires scholars fluent 
in various dialects, intimately familiar with the norms and customs of various immigrant groups, 
who can develop and analyze qualitative materials. Asking community residents about their 
experiences and the dynamics within their neighborhoods will be an informative way to examine 
why there are crime declines, crime increases, or why there is no change in crime where 
immigrant populations are living and changing. Rich, multi-lingual, qualitative data can provide 
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measures for many of the variables omitted in this dissertation. Moreover, they can shed light on 
differences between communities with documented and undocumented populations, with foreign-
born populations from the same or different nations of origin, how and why gendered 
constructions in other nations and the host nation can influence community structure as well as 
collective efficacy, and the receptiveness of native-born resident populations to changing 
immigrant populations in the community. Qualitative evidence alone, or in combination with 
official secondary source data, may lead to theoretical contributions that offer a more complete 
picture of community safety mechanisms in areas with diverse and changing populations. Such 
theoretical and empirical advances are most possible when social science communities 
intentionally cultivate ethnoracial inclusivity across the disciplines while funding, highlighting, 
and including the contributions made by our future, as well as current, immigrant and ethnoracial 
minority scholars in our most widely-read and respected peer-reviewed publications.  
CONCLUSION 
Decades of cross-sectional studies on the effect of immigrant populations on community 
organization and crime have yet to offer support for the continued public/political rhetoric that 
posits increases in immigration has a strong, clear, relationship to increases in crime (Chavez, 
2013; Johnston and Morse, 2011; Green, 2016; Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012; Provine and Doty, 
2011; Reid et al, 2005; Zatz and Smith, 2012). Yet, despite the conclusions presented in the body 
of immigration-crime literature- specifically that there is an inverse or null effect of immigrant 
population increases on community violent crime- there remains strong public sentiment counter 
to empirical results and aspects of immigration-crime research left to explore (Ousey and Kubrin, 
2017). This dissertation adds another layer of depth to criminological immigration and 
communities work by disaggregating Chicago communities’ Hispanic/Latin@ population by 
nativity, immigrant population by ethnicity, and immigrant population by Hispanic/Latin@ nation 
of origin.  
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The findings presented in this work paint a picture of a more nuanced relationship 
between immigrant population changes in communities and changes in community crime than 
what has been presented in the lion’s share of notable immigration and crime studies. In 
predominantly white communities, changes in the Hispanic foreign-born population and Hispanic 
foreign-born population from Mexico may destabilize social organization enough to inhibit crime 
controlling mechanisms. Yet, across all other neighborhood predominant ethnoracial 
neighborhood types, changes in immigrant populations have a null or inverse effect on violent 
crime. Long-standing public and political anti-immigrant rhetoric that claim increases in 
immigration result in violent crime still have little to no empirical support; however, the findings 
in the current work continue to stress the importance of community context and the construction 
of ethnicity within the U.S. ethnoracial social structure. Further, the current work also suggests 
that in Chicago (2012-2000), in some communities, increases in the proportion of a community 
population who were foreign-born did not consistently have a null or inverse effect on violent 
crime rates. The question: “Why are there differences?” remains, and research to identify the 
mechanisms that drive differential immigration and community crime results will certainly 
contribute to criminological theory as well as inform policy and program changes that promote 
community safety. 
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX A: VARIABLES AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS 
Variable Operationalization 
Percent Young Male Percent of tract population who are male and age 15-24 years  
Percent Married with Children Percent of tract population who are married with children  
Percent Foreign-born Percent of tract population who report their birth as outside the United States  
Change in Percent Foreign-born Percent of tract population who report their birth as outside the United States 
2009 minus 2000. 
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic/Latino Percent of tract population who report birth in a Latin nation (as defined by 
U.S. Decennial Census) 
Change in Foreign-born Hispanic/Latino Percent of tract population who report birth in a Latin nation (as defined by 
U.S. Decennial Census) 2009 minus 2000. 
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic/Latino Percent of tract population who report birth in a nation other than a Latin 
nation 
Change in Percent Foreign-born non-
Hispanic/Latino 
Percent of tract population who report birth in a nation other than a Latin 
nation 2009 minus 2000. 
Percent white non-Hispanic Percent of tract population who self-report identifying with white race and 
non-Hispanic. 
Percent Black non-Hispanic Percent of tract population who self-report identifying with Black race and 
non-Hispanic. 
Percent Asian non-Hispanic Percent of tract population who self-report identifying with Asian race and 
non-Hispanic. 
Percent Hispanic non-foreign-born Percent of tract population who self-report any race and Hispanic ethnicity. 
White Neighborhood (1)  Percent of the tract population who self-report White non-Hispanic 
race/ethnicity is greater than or equal to 70% 
Black Neighborhood (1) Percent of the tract population who self-report Black non-Hispanic 
race/ethnicity is greater than or equal to 70% 
Hispanic Neighborhood (1) Percent of the tract population of any race who self-report Hispanic ethnicity 
is greater than or equal to 70% 
Minority Neighborhood (1) Sum of the percent of the tract population who self-report Hispanic ethnicity 
of any race or Black race is greater than or equal to 70%  
Integrated Neighborhood (1) Percent of the tract population who self-report Hispanic ethnicity of any race, 
or Black race, or White race, or Asian race is less than or equal to 70% 
Disadvantage Index Average of the standardized scores of six variables: Percent secondary, low-
wage jobs, percent unemployed, percent professional, percent female-headed 
households, percent high school graduates, and percent poverty  
Residential Instability Index Average of the standardized scores of two variables (percent renting and 
percent who moved into residence in the past year)  
Violent Crime 2000 Sum of murders and robberies known to police 1999, 2000, 2001; divided by 
three and rounded to nearest whole number. 
Violent Crime 2012 Sum of murders and robberies known to police 2011, 2012 and 2013, divided 
by three and rounded to nearest whole number. 
Change in Violent Crime Violent Crime 2000 subtracted from Violent Crime 2012. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1: HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2 WITH PROPOSED MODELS 1 THROUGH 6 
Hypothesis 1: In Chicago communities where there are increases (2009-2000) in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, there will be 
decreases in community (2012-2000) violent crimes (2012-2000) 
Hypothesis 2: In Chicago communities where there are increases (2009-2000) in the non-Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, there will be 
decreases in community violent crimes (2012-2000)  
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APPENDIX TABLE 1.1: HYPOTHESES 3 AND 4 WITH PROPOSED MODELS 7 THROUGH 23 
Hypothesis 3: Where there are changes in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population by nation of origin (2009-2000) there will be an inverse 
effect of immigrant population change on community violent crime. 
Hypothesis 4: In communities by predominant ethnoracial type, where there is a change in the immigrant population by ethnicity (2009-2000) 
there will be inverse effects on community violent crime. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR COMMUNITIES WHERE FOREIGN-BORN INCREASED  
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